The chain of events that weakened the UK’s most critical defence system.
- The Indo Pacific Region is thousands of miles away from the UK but the peaceful passage of trade through that area is of fundamental importance to the continued prosperity of our Island Nation. That is also true for the Atlantic and it is reassuring that our Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, when he was First Sea Lord, placed the highest priority on:
- Combating the submarine threat in that Ocean and,
- Investing properly in the air groups and global effectiveness of our two new capital warships, the aircraft carriers Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales.
- This cannot be achieved effectively through continued inappropriate investment in heavy armour (tanks), hundreds of dysfunctional armoured personnel carriers (Ajax) and short range, noncarrier capable, tactical fighter aircraft (Typhoon and Tempest).
- Although Doctor Evans’ Paper is predominantly about the important proactive part that the US Army can and should play East of Suez, one can read between the lines that a major shift in investment for each of UK’s Armed Forces is necessary if we are to play a constructive part in policing that Region along with our Allies.
- Quite rightly, the intuitive “Ring-of-Fires” philosophy presented to counter Chinese hegemony and control did not, and I believe this to be of critical importance, refer in any way to a “boots on the ground” policy. There was no mention of the pre-positioning of conventional heavy armour (e.g., tanks). That is because, entirely logically, such weapon systems are not deployable in strength throughout the Global Commons and have no part to play in deterring the expansionist intentions of China in the Indo Pac Region. (Nor, of course, do they have any part to play in the maritime policing of the Atlantic Region.)
- Doctor Evans Paper makes the coherent case that in spite of massive military and global investment, China’s aim of world domination is not quite as scary and achievable as fear-mongers might have us believe. It is not such a one-sided equation.
- She suggests that “the essential foundation for a deterrence concept, a Ring of Fires would employ Army [and Navy and Marine Corps] precision, long-range strike capabilities to target PRC land and maritime assets and which, in the unlikely event of war, would cripple China’s economic means of survival.”
- She opines that, “Contrary to conventional wisdom, the tyranny of distance does not necessarily favor Chinese over US forces in the Indo-Pacific. In fact, the PRC has significant disadvantages in the maritime domain due to its long and vulnerable SLOCs. Beijing’s energy, vital natural resources, manufacturing supply chains, and export trade must pass through the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Crucially, the PLAN and China’s merchant fleet must transit through the straits of the Indonesian archipelago, namely, the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits to the South China Sea. These choke points are critical vulnerabilities, which the PRC recognizes as such.”
- And she continues, “When traversing from the Straits of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, and the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean, Chinese merchant ships and naval vessels, as well as their military port logistics bases along the Maritime Silk Road, would be vulnerable to kinetic forms of attack as well as cyber disruption. Vast geographical distances and extended SLOCs typically represent vulnerabilities that can be attacked if insufficiently protected, as witnessed by the campaigns to control the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans during the Second World War. These geography-based weaknesses, in combination with recent US Army modernization efforts and investments in long-range precision strike and hypersonic missile capabilities, afford the Joint Force a unique and as yet underutilized means of contributing to a Ring-of-Fires concept that would support INDOPACOM’s Joint All-Domain operations.”
- I would suggest that UK’s Strategic Military Planners take serious note of Doctor Evans’ paper, especially the “Ring-of-Fires” concept, and forge a new way ahead for equipping our land-based Armed Forces appropriately. Our own Royal Marines as well as the United States Marine Corps have already adapted themselves to this model for effective global deterrence. Unfortunately for the RAF, land-based noncarrier capable tactical fighter aircraft have no effective role within this concept and investment in the same needs to be curtailed.
- The principal raison d’être of the RAF now should be “supporting the Royal Navy Fixed Wing Fleet Air Arm by ensuring that our 2 new aircraft carriers enjoy full-sized combat-ready air groups that embark whenever a carrier puts to sea and are deployable at a moment’s notice”.
- Deploying UK’s scarce resources of F-35B Lightning II fighter aircraft to Akrotiri in Cyprus does nothing to deter the Chinese. Nor does it have any measurable influence on the conduct of operations in Ukraine.
- Question. If, as Doctor Evans suggests, “most experts agree the Indo-Pacific region is the fulcrum for the future global security order and thus of critical concern”, should UK’s Government now readdress its procurement priorities and concentrate defence budget expenditure on countering China’s growing military, political and commercial influence in that Region and beyond?
- Answer. It is eminently logical that it should do so. Of the UK Armed Forces, it is only the Royal Navy with its Fleet Weapon System that is able to answer that call and “supplement the Government’s words of commitment to allies and partners with a plan of action that actively improves interoperability and military-to-military cooperation”.