To say that Putin’s mobilization of military power close to the Ukraine border is costing Russia a lot of additional funding is questionable and, as such, appears to strengthen the Russian Leader’s poker hand.
Russia enjoys a powerful and very active military. With or without the stand-off over Ukraine, all 3 elements of that military (land, sea and air) need to be exercised regularly to maintain combat performance and readiness. Further, Putin needs to demonstrate to potential adversaries the will to defend his homeland’s sovereignty and, therefore, he exercises his military forces close to the borders of other nations. He has been doing this for a considerable period without inviting any serious bluster or hyperbole from Western politicians. These exercises send an important signal to those who might think of invading his homeland, and, at the same time, they satisfy the need for maintaining combat performance and readiness. In other words, his posturing close to the border of Ukraine costs the Russian defence budget no more money than it would otherwise have spent.
Our political leaders would do well to recognize this and to start thinking “outside the box” about where limited defence budget funds should be concentrated. Investment in Britain’s Armed Forces represents an outstanding example of why such lateral thinking needs to be brought into play.
UK (and USA) Military Power Projection into combat zones or theatres of high tension within the Global Commons has been achieved predominantly by Naval Task Forces. At the same time, other naval units have been deployed across the world conducting deterrence, policing and the provision of humanitarian aid. This has required many Naval Service personnel being committed to these frontline tasks.
For example, during the Libyan crisis in 2011, 25% of Naval manpower was deployed in the frontline, whether supporting the Libya operation or continuing to contribute directly in other parts of the world to the policing of the Global Commons. This represented Britain’s most effective contribution to deterring those that might undermine our National Possessions and Overseas Interests (especially assuring the safe movement of our trade and energy supplies).
In that same year, the Army and the RAF had approximately 5% of their total manpower deployed in the frontline supporting our political and military power projection needs. These numbers have not changed markedly.
It is relevant to note that neither of these 2 Services can deploy large numbers of ground forces or fighter aircraft, respectively, to the Indo Pacific region or the South Atlantic without relying upon the utility and capability of Royal Navy warships.
With respect to budgetary matters and in the light of UK’s Strategic Maritime Policy, this limitation should be a firm guide to a new and more logical military investment program. The Service that provides for most of the Expeditionary Force Operations, trade route security and the physical defence of our overseas interests should logically receive the greatest investment in capability. This is worthy of immediate study in Whitehall. A careful understanding of the combat utility and deployability of each Service’s weapon systems must come into play if the UK is to benefit properly from the limited funds that it has available for defence and security.
The justification for a robust and much expanded Royal Navy is very sound.
But in sharp contrast, there is no justification for supporting the existence of at least 7 Typhoon fighter squadrons that are constrained to operate from land bases and are therefore of little utility beyond the European theatre. There is a similar lack of justification for maintaining a large land-based Army whose deployability outside the European theatre is minimal without adequate naval platforms to carry and support them.
Putin’s power projection in defence of Russia through the regular medium of large military gatherings of force and military manoeuvres close to its borders must be viewed as exercises in deterrence through visible military power. If viewed as such, it is no more jingoistic or confrontational than the global power projection and policing of the high seas as conducted by the UK Royal Navy, the U.S. Navy, and other Western allies.
Such an understanding could and should lead to less knee-jerk sabre-rattling and hyperbole and would be the basis for more balanced and successful negotiation.
It comes to mind that the lack of common sense and good leadership emanating from the White House and its “experts” concerning Ukraine amounts to fear mongering. By exaggerating the real risks of major confrontation associated with the current “crisis”, the Administration appears to be diverting attention away from several serious issues at home. If that is so, it is a dangerous hand to play in a poker game when your adversary probably has a winning hand.
This is all entirely plausible. It is not just the USA trying to divert attention from issues at home, Boris appears to be playing that game too. If a government’s primary duty is to defend/protect the homeland, then how can it be dependent on a potential adversary for oil (diesel) and gas. Being self sufficient for the production of electricity is a must and successive UK governments have failed the people by taking too much notice of small, vociferous minorities who do not have the welfare of th UK at heart. As a result the people are paying the price and have every right to be angry about it.
This is all entirely plausible. It is not just the USA trying to divert attention from issues at home, Boris appears to be playing that game too. If a government’s primary duty is to defend/protect the homeland, then how can it be dependent on a potential adversary for oil (diesel) and gas. Being self sufficient for the production of electricity is a must and successive UK governments have failed the people by taking too much notice of small, vociferous minorities who do not have the welfare of th UK at heart. As a result the people are paying the price and have every right to be angry about it.