“Why does the Minister of State not question
the identity and ownership of all F-35B Squadrons?”

Introduction.

  1. It is important to understand Minister of State Baroness Goldie’s published terms of reference:

Baroness Goldie DL.

Minister of State for Defence.

Responsibilities.

Spokesperson in the House of Lords on all defence matters, responsible for corporate governance, international arms control and counter-proliferation, European Union (EU) and Asia/Far East defence engagement.

Her many responsibilities include:

      • Future relations with European union.
      • Engagement with retired senior defence personnel and wider opinion formers.

Discussion.

  1. With such a portfolio, it is not surprising that the Baroness does not appear to have had the time to have been briefed properly on the need for the Royal Navy to be given direct Command and Control of the F-35B Lightning II aircraft.
  2. This is particularly important in the light of current events in the Indo-Pacific region where naval Power through Strength needs to be demonstrated by the UK in conjunction with the United States and our Allies, in Europe as well as in theatre. This Strategic Power is vested in our Integrated Fleet Weapons System which depends upon embarked air power as one major foundation for its air defence, its offensive firepower and, critically, it’s deterrence of those that would harm our interests.
  3. The written answer provided by the Baroness to Admiral Lord West’s written parliamentary question (HL1253) is therefore a cause for not a little concern:

Question.

“To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the Written Answer by Baroness Goldie on 20 June (HL691), whether there has been a change to the agreement that two squadrons would have Royal Naval Fleet Air Arm designation. (HL1253)”

The Answer was as follows:

“Three F35 Squadrons are designated as Royal Air Force. A fourth, 809 Naval Air Squadron will carry Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm designs. The fifth Lighting Force squadron has yet to be designated, with a timeline on identity and ownership yet to be established.” (Sad to see that “Lightning” is incorrectly spelt.)

  1. Bearing in mind that the initial procurement of the F-35B by the UK was with the specific intent of embarking these aircraft in our 2 new carriers, the Minister of State’s answer is disturbing.
  2. In her remit, “Engagement with retired senior defence personnel and wider opinion formers”, has she reached out to other than retired RAF personnel and RAF sponsored Land-Based Airpower Academics from King’s College London? If not, she will not have been persuaded to access proven Naval Air Warfare and Carrier Battle Group expertise.
  3. It is this expertise, based upon decades of deployed Operations, that would have reliably informed her of the following:
    1. UK’s only global Power Projection Capability is vested in her Majesty’s Royal Navy and its ability to deploy an Expeditionary Task Force or Carrier Battle Group rapidly to a theatre of tension or combat in a time of need.
    2. These deployments rely on fully integrated weapons systems for their defence and in-theatre survival: the Fleet Weapon System. This includes Surface Warships, Submarines, Anti-submarine Helicopters, Royal Marine Units, Royal Fleet Auxiliaries and, finally, Aircraft Carriers with fully worked-up, embarked fighter air defence and offence Air Groups of F-35B Lightning II aircraft. This is fully in keeping with UK’s declared Strategic Maritime Policy.
    3. Each commissioned frontline F-35B squadron (whether Naval or RAF) needs to be directly linked operationally to one of our 2 new carriers so that they can be embarked and worked up within the Fleet Weapon System at the behest of their carrier commanding officer. This is a proven recipe for achieving full integration and operational excellence.
    4. Conceding Administrative and Operational control of all F-35B fighters to the RAF endangers the cohesive effectiveness and utility of the Fleet Weapon System.
  4. Hopefully, the Minister of State would wish to be briefed on the importance and validity of subparagraph 7.d., above. My recent Insight, “Follow-Up to my Submission to the DSC Aviation Procurement Inquiry”, covers this in some detail and provides comment on the true availability of the F-35B for our two Aircraft Carriers. It concludes that:
    1. Full RAF commitment to Naval Operations and our Strategic Maritime Policy simply cannot be trusted and relied upon. Promised verbal commitment is frequently unfulfilled and this represents a major hazard to the global safety, survival and capability of the Royal Navy Fleet Weapon System.

And it recommends that:

    1. Operational Control of all military aircraft assets procured in direct support of Maritime Operations, including F-35B and Poseidon, should be immediately transferred to the Royal Navy. Failure to accomplish this makes a mockery of the UK’s Strategic Maritime Policy and Capability.
  1. You will have noted from the above that there is a glaring disconnect between channels of Parliamentary Oversight on Defence matters and, Military Reality. Lewis Page’s article in the Telegraph of Sunday, 17 July 2002, exemplifies this disconnect and suggests extraordinary if not criminal fraudulent conspiracy, and dreadful advice by a partisan team of Whitehall Mandarins:

How 13 Whitehall mandarins crippled Britain’s aircraft carriers

  1. Facilitating this conspiracy is the habit that those at the top of the tree in Whitehall are often theoretically so busy that they demand single page briefings, even on Strategic Military Matters of great import. The written answer from the Minister of State for Defence to the question raised by Admiral Lord West of Spithead clearly suffers from this problem.
  2. Based on decades of embarked Naval Air Warfare expertise, it is entirely illogical:
    1. for the Ministry of Defence not to designate each front-line F-35B Squadron as either a Queen Elizabeth Squadron or a Prince of Wales Squadron and,
    2. for the RAF not to cede Command and Control of these squadrons to the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm and each of the aircraft carriers.
  3. Failure to do so, would represent a serious threat to the UK’s Military and Political Power Projection Capability, to the integrity and security of the Fleet Weapon System and, in turn, to National Security.

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