“Seeing the world through Rose-tinted spectacles.”

1. The Channel 4 TV Documentary, “Falklands War: The Untold Story”, comes across as a revealing but not entirely forthright compendium of the sometimes-questionable decisions/actions that, according to General Sir Mike Rose, 22 SAS and some other contributors, “could have cost us the war”. At a time when we should all be celebrating the extraordinary success of the Naval Task Force and of our superb ground forces led by the Royal Marines alongside prestigious regiments of the Army, the Documentary suffers from the “glass half empty” syndrome. Further and unforgivably, it suffers from serious omission and a major propaganda/wishful thinking input from the Royal Air Force.
2. The main contributor to the TV show, General Rose, has an impeccable, highly respected Army and SAS background that I wholeheartedly applaud. But for the sake of historical authenticity, he (and the Documentary producers) could have done a little more research into the broader/detailed aspects of the Campaign.

CRITIQUE – MAJOR POINTS – ROSE – “It’s time the full story is told.”

3. A Major Omission: Whilst commenting somewhat pompously on a variety of “failures” during the war, Rose and the Documentary team failed to mention the biggest failure of all, i.e. the broken promise by the RAF to provide the Fleet at sea with fighter air defence throughout the oceans of the world. They were conspicuously absent throughout the Campaign. Their lack of honesty concerning this matter had convinced Ministers not to invest in Carrier Strike Power and was the major factor in the Falklands War becoming a close-run thing.
4. A Misguided Comment: In keeping with paragraph 3 above, Rose complains that the Task Force command structure should have been a tri-service affair including the RAF. He is obviously a fan of Jointery. But there was no justification for the RAF to be involved with Task Force command status. The Royal Navy has its own Air Force, the Fleet Air Arm, specializing in Naval Air Warfare – a role and skill-set that is beyond the expertise and experience of the RAF. And didn’t we do a good job without them and with very limited assets?
5. Shameful Misinformation and Propaganda: During the introduction to the Documentary and within its main body, Wing Commander Sid Edwards claims that, throughout the war, the RAF provided vital intelligence to the Task Force from a Nimrod signal intelligence aircraft (SIGINT) based offshore in Chile. He postulates that this was “a secret weapon without which we would have lost the war”. He says that his information was provided by 3^rd parties “who should know”! Absolute nonsense and pure propaganda! Despite a plethora of plagiarism from my first book and many false claims, the “Harrier 809” book does provide in-depth accounts of the two RAF initiatives to provide the Task Force with active intelligence concerning the disposition and deployment of Argentine Forces. Operation FOLKLORE (Canberra) and Operation ACME (Nimrod SIGINT), take up much of the book but have minimal relevance to the actual conduct of combat operations. Once hostilities commenced, the Canberra and the Nimrod elements deployed at Chilean sovereign bases were withdrawn, and these initiatives played no part thereafter.
6. Correction: Rose on Chain of Command. Rear-Admiral Sandy Woodward was not “in charge of the Task Force”. He was Commander Carrier Task Group.
7. Correction: Rose on Chain of Command. Commodore Michael Clapp was Commander Amphibious Task Group.
8. Omission. Rose completely ignores the significant part played by Sea Harrier in support/defence of San Carlos Landings. He dismisses it in perfunctory fashion using the words “without air superiority”. He should have listened to Julian Thompson’s assessment: “The reasons for the British success in the War were as follows (not verbatim):
   1. “First, the Sea Harrier was brilliant. We won partly because the Sea Harrier was able to shoot down the Argentine Air Force, whittle them down with only 20 aircraft against 200.
   2. Second, the Navy established sea control by the sinking of the Belgrano by the submarine HMS Conqueror – the Argentine Navy never went to sea again. So we had control of the sea and over time we had air parity.
   3. Third, our guys were better led with superior training. This was an absolute game changer.”
9. Lack of understanding of the role of frigates and destroyers at the San Carlos Water Beachhead. Rose is openly and mistakenly critical of the loss of several warships and the Atlantic Conveyor. Commodore Michael Clapp, Commander of the Amphibious Task Group formed a Ring of Steel with our warships up-threat of San Carlos Water and within Falkland Sound: with the purpose of soaking up air attack punishment that would otherwise have been vented on the Amphibious Landing Force. It was a very carefully considered, highly successful sacrifice with a noble purpose. Not a failure.
10. Correction: Atlantic Conveyor was not “en route to the beachhead by day” as suggested in the Documentary, and “because of this, vulnerable to air attack”. This is an unwarranted implied criticism of the Command. The Conveyor was in company with the Carrier Battle Group and within the outer ring of air defence when she was hit. Very sad but better her than one of the aircraft carriers who were responsible for opposing and deterring/diluting Argentine air attacks. Not a Command failure.
11. Omission: Sea Harrier Deterrence. The Documentary/Rose fails to acknowledge the vital impact of May 1^st Sea Harrier Air-to-Air combat victories over Argentine Mirage III, Canberra and Dagger aircraft. Following this, the Mirage III Squadron Commander announced that his aircraft could not win such engagements. The immediate success of the Sea Harrier air-to-air weapon system was to have a major beneficial effect on the course of the air war and the protection of our ground forces – deterrence in being. No failure here.
12. The Tragedy of Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram at Bluff Cove. The Documentary covers this in detail, and I would agree with the general view presented that the whole affair represented a considerable failure. No intelligence concerning the move from San Carlos Water to Bluff Cove was passed to the Anti-Air Warfare Control Ship (AAWC), HMS Invincible. I was airborne on combat air patrol on the night that the transit took place and detected one of the 2 landing ships on my Sea Harrier radar when it was about 25 miles south of Bluff Cove. The AAWC could not tell me whether it was friend or foe and so I refrained from attacking it with my cannon. The Documentary spells out much of what happened the following morning but, as we are talking about failures, fails to make it fully clear that the embarked Commanding Officer of the Welsh Guards prevaricated over how and when his soldiers should be disembarked. I understand that his indecision lasted for approximately 5 hours – and this arguably sealed the fate of embarked personnel.
13. Winging It: Rose complains that when paying his respects to Admiral Sandy, he wasn’t given precise instructions as to what to do. He reports that Sandy just said, “Please do the best you can”. Rose then tells us proudly that he had to “wing it”. If I had embarked in Invincible and said to my brilliant Captain, JJ Black, “What are your precise instructions, Sir?” JJ would have told me in very simple language to “Foxtrot Oscar and get on with it”. We planned our tactics and movements at Squadron level, keeping the command informed. The same routine should have been applicable to the SAS.
14. Question: Why was there no mention of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS)? Was it because they did not fail?
15. Question: The Satellite Radios. As they were such a carefully guarded possession of the SAS, how did one end up on the bridge of HMS Sheffield – when the radio’s transmissions interfered with the electronic warning of the incoming Exocet? Whose “failure” was that?
16. There is much to ponder in all the above, is there not? Perhaps the answer is to keep one’s glass half full, stop complaining and just get on with the job you’re paid to do. (Not that I would ever argue with command instructions, would I? Chuckle!)
17. A great soldier but a poor Documentary that diminishes a superb Naval and Land Force victory!