“Making the Same Mistake Twice Would Be Insane”.

1. Behind the scenes in Whitehall and not yet properly understood by the taxpayer, there is a move afoot in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to repeat the costly procurement mistakes of the 70s – thereby prejudicing Britain’s ability to protect its global national interests.

1982.

2. As 1982 dawned, Maggie Thatcher’s government planned to sell off the new aircraft carrier HMS Invincible. This was a green light for Galtierie’s invasion of the Falkland Islands. The Ministry of Defence had already restricted the number and size of the fixed wing air groups destined for the 3 Invincible class carriers – 3 carrier decks but only 2 small air groups.
3. The initial procurement cost of the Sea Harrier project (for embarkation in our carriers) was £100 million. During the same Cold War period, approval had been given for the Tornado project – initial procurement cost approximately £13 billion for more than 300 air defence and ground attack tactical fighter aircraft (130 times the Sea Harrier cost). Those Tornadoes were not deployable in carriers and therefore of no utility for Military Power Projection and Air Defence of the Fleet across the Global Commons (a further £10 billion was wasted on the associated ill-fated JP 233 Runway Denial Weapon System).
4. This lack of deployability was clearly demonstrated as the Task Force sailed South without the land-based air defence promised by MOD in support of the 1967 Healey carrier decision. The limited investment in and the small number of Sea Harriers available made Operation Corporate for the recovery of the Falklands a very close-run thing.

2022.

5. 40 years on and now we have a regrettable case of déjà vu. A very similar situation has arisen.
6. We have 2 new aircraft carriers in service but not enough F-35B fighter aircraft to embark in them as effective air defence air groups. A significant proportion of the small number of aircraft that have been ordered to date, 48, will be needed for a large Headquarters and Training Squadron and there are other needs that will adversely affect the numbers of frontline aircraft available for embarkation.
7. But, as in 1982, the MOD is resisting further investment in the F-35B. Instead it is planning to invest in a new tactical fighter aircraft, the Tempest, which is currently undergoing design and development at major cost and that, under present plans, will not be carrier capable. Following in the footsteps of the short-range tactical fighter aircraft Tornado project and then the Typhoon project, both of which absorbed a huge share of the MOD’s defence budget, it will have no utility at all for supporting global expeditionary force deployments and providing associated deterrence of those who would harm our interests.
8. MOD/Air is describing the Tempest Project as UK’s Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and by doing so is ignoring the lack of utility and success of its 2 earlier fighter procurement programs. It is also ignoring the state-of-the-art utility and planned lifespan of the F-35B.
9. Nugatory investment in this Tempest program will detract/is already detracting from the defence budget funding available for the Royal Navy – the tip of the spear for UK’s declared Strategic Maritime Policy and our only effective power projection tool.
10. With respect to UK’s Island Nation status and in the light of declared government Policy, Britain’s Present and Future Combat Air System (PFCAS) is, de facto, the Royal Navy with its fully integrated Fleet Weapon System. This is readily deployable throughout the Global Commons, does not rely on basing rights or overflight rights, and incorporates:
    1. the antisubmarine capability of our surface warships and their embarked helicopters,
    2. our Hunter Killer submarines,
    3. the logistic support of our Royal Fleet Auxiliaries,
    4. the powerful warfighting capability of the Royal Marines including amphibious support,
    5. Merchant Marine support when required and, last but not least,
    6. Airspace Denial and Air Superiority, courtesy of our new aircraft carriers and their fixed wing air groups.
11. Conclusion and Recommendation. The Tempest design team must now be instructed by our Secretary of State for Defence that the aircraft must be designed primarily for embarkation and deployment in our 2 new carriers as a 24/7 component of the Fleet Weapon System. If the MOD and the design team resist this vital requirement, then the project should be cancelled forthwith.

Letters in the Times of the 13^th of May.

12. The Ukraine affair is now being used by those with other unjustifiable partisan interests to advocate more investment in anachronistic weapon systems. These advocates appear to have ignored the major shift in the manner in which “boots on the ground” combat operations are to be conducted in the future.
13. Two of these senior advocates wrote letters to the Times which were published on May 13. They appear to be using the Ukraine affair as justification for more urgent investment in our land force capability. Here is an extract of what they had to say:
    1. General Lord Dannatt
       “The case to increase our defence spending to 3 per cent of GDP is growing, as is the need to invest rapidly in our land warfare capabilities.”
    2. General Sir Richard Barrons
       “The entire British Army today has the people, equipment and stocks to defend only perhaps half the Donbas region. … Paying for armed forces that match commitment with capability cannot be avoided.”

If Britain was a landlocked nation bordering on Russia, as is Ukraine, there would be validity for the Generals’ case for more urgent investment in our Army. Clearly, that is not the case. Our Whitehall Masters should turn a deaf ear to their entreaties and concentrate all available investment in strengthening our Strategic Maritime Forces and Weapon Systems. They should also ask the Generals, “What is the utility of heavy armour including tanks and artillery for the direct defence of our Island Shores?”

There is none.