“Three Cuckoos that threaten the effectiveness
of our Strategic Maritime Policy”.

Introduction.

1. The effective strategic defence of U.K.’s interests at home and abroad is postulated as and should be the number one priority for our government. It should recognize this and reflect it properly with targeted and timely investment in our declared Strategic Maritime Policy. I trust that the ongoing Defence Select Committee Inquiry into “Armed Forces Readiness” will address the strategic mobility and timely deployability or otherwise of land-based air and surface weapon systems in the context of being able to respond rapidly to global threats that threaten our lifeblood interests and, in doing so, may well conclude that our Strategic Maritime Policy is not being taken seriously.
2. Hopefully, the Committee will identify three Cuckoos that mitigate against the robust implementation of that Policy and that are directly or indirectly responsible for the taxpayer not getting a decent bang for the buck:
   1. Cuckoo Number One. Inordinate and unjustifiable investment in relatively short-range land-based combat aircraft for our Air Force and heavy armour (e.g. battle tanks and heavy artillery) for our Army.
   2. Cuckoo Number Two. Allowing major defence contractors to have undue, self-interest influence in the generation of and lack of accountability for Military Procurement Projects.
   3. Cuckoo Number Three. A less than productive and unjustifiable number of Civil Servants “supporting” individual Armed Services and Central Staffs within the Ministry of Defence.

Cuckoo Number One.

3. Since 1979, inflation-adjusted figures for investment in RAF land-based combat aircraft is now approaching £400 billion. I do not have the figures for investment in the U.K. Army’s heavy armour over the same period, but it is safe to suggest that such investment costs have also been eye-watering. And what has been the return for such extravagant investment?
4. The answer is, very little:
   1. 1982 – The Falklands War. Land-based combat aircraft and heavy armour unable to be deployed.
   2. 1982 to the end of the Cold War. Tornado ADV lacked a functioning Beyond Visual Range Air to Air weapon system: leaving the UK homeland base devoid of land-based air defence against the Soviet threat.
   3. Desert Storm. Dysfunctional Tornado ADV kept away from the front line by Stormin’ Norman Schwarzkopf. After significant losses, Tornado GR1 was removed from its specialist role of low-level high-speed airfield target interdiction. U.K.’s heavy battle tanks were deployed but could not keep up with the advance against Saddam Hussein’s forces.
   4. Afghanistan. The obsolete Tornado GR4 was unable to provide timely Combat Air Support to our ground forces. UK heavy armour was not involved.
   5. Libya. Land-based Tornado GR4 Storm Shadow missions failed to acquire and hit their targets. High-level bombing missions by Tornadoes accompanied by Typhoons failed to have any impact, but they cost the taxpayer in excess of £1.4 billion. UK heavy armour was not deployed.
   6. The assault against ISIS. In Syria and Iraq, combined missions of Tornado and Typhoon against undefended targets resulted in about 4,000 Jihadis being killed at a cost in excess of £4 billion. UK heavy armour was not involved.
5. The major investment in land-based combat air and heavy armour since 1979 has therefore failed to result in any cost-effective combat success or deterrence of those that would harm our global interests. But it has proved to be a veritable Cuckoo in the nest of defence procurement and expenditure, denying more justifiable investment in our Fleet Weapon System which underpins declared Strategic Policy.

Cuckoo Number Two.

6. On face value, the Ministry of Defence has allowed a partnership to be developed with major defence contractors that has allowed the latter to wield unseemly self-interest influence in the generation of and lack of financial accountability concerning major military procurement projects. For decades now, the true costs of weapon systems and platforms and of modification programs needed to make that weapon system or platform work as specified has been hidden from the public. These costs have often been carefully hidden from Defence Select Committees, Public Accounts Committees and other parliamentary bodies. Significant examples of this malpractice have been the Tornado project, the Typhoon project and the Queen Elizabeth class Carrier project.
7. The cost of the Carrier project pales into insignificance when compared with the total cost of the two collaborative fighter projects – each of which are cuckoos in the nest and have swallowed an unjustifiable major share of the defence budget without earning their keep in strategic defence utility terms.
8. Inexplicably, we now have a third land-based, short-range fighter project being ushered covertly through the design and development process without any formal and detailed overt justification concerning its strategic global military utility, mobility and deterrence value, if any, against those that would harm our national interests worldwide. This emerging cuckoo is known as the Tempest program, better known in some circles as the Future Combat Air System.

Cuckoo Number Three.

9. The wasteful and unjustifiable diversion of defence budget funding to elements that do not conform with or support declared Strategic Maritime Policy, as realised by Cuckoos number One and Two above, is compounded by the excessive numbers and associated costs of Civil Servants within the Ministry of Defence organisation – tens of thousands of them and more in total than the personnel strengths of either the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force. (Some pruning would appear to be in order if we are to invest more wisely in the tip of the spear of our military capability.)
10. These Civil Servants are led by an unelected Permanent Under-secretary of State for Defence (PUS). “This officeholder is the government’s principal civilian adviser on Defence matters and is a member of the Defence Council and the Defence Board. He or she is the MOD Principal Accounting Officer and is called to give evidence to the Defence Select Committee and the Public Accounts Committee.”
11. He or she is a very powerful figure that outranks the Chief of Defence Staff but is often devoid of any military experience, expertise or, critically, understanding. As the “MOD Principal Accounting Officer”, it is not unreasonable to suggest that he or she should carefully monitor and hold to account the Civil Servants and Military Officers who are or were responsible for the major and unjustified investment in:
    1. The two collaborative projects, Tornado and Typhoon, and now
    2. The Tempest project, of which the formal Staff Requirement and Specification has not been revealed properly to the Defence Select Committee, the Public Accounts Committee or indeed, the House of Lords and Parliament.
12. Subparagraph 11, b, above is particularly relevant to the need to justify properly procurement initiatives that provide direct support to our global national security. The Ministry of Defence has already earmarked up to £15 billion for the development of the Tempest, a.k.a. the Future Combat Air System, but on what grounds (this is more than the combined cost of our two new aircraft carriers and their air groups)?
    1. What is the formal Requirement?
    2. What is the formal Specification?
    3. What is the justification for a tactical fighter aircraft that will have no more effective global reach and influence than Tornado and Typhoon?
13. In the light of U.K.’s Strategic Maritime Policy, further funding for the Tempest project should be immediately curtailed unless its Requirement and Specification unambiguously declares that it is being developed primarily for embarkation in our two new carriers and those of our Allies. Without such a declaration, that is supported by actions not just words, the Tempest is a major Cuckoo in the Nest that will consume funding that is urgently required by our Navy and its Fleet Weapons System.
14. It is upon the latter that our global military and political power projection capability depends.