The simple answer to this generalised question is: “practically everything”. My planned way ahead as Chief of the Air Staff would have been as different as chalk and cheese compared with what actually took place.
As the 50s and 60s developed, I would have noted with valid concern that the many British Interventions and Expeditionary Force Operations East of Suez had been centred upon the utility, rapid deployability and flexibility of Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) with Fleet Air Arm tactical fighter and bomber aircraft embarked. This would have brought into focus Trenchard’s prediction that eventually the land-based Air Force would be subsumed by and brought under the operational control of the Royal Navy and the Army. In the light of the ongoing Cold War which Trenchard could not have predicted, I would have decided to question his prediction and be prepared to present to Ministers the case for maintaining a functional Land-Based Tactical Air Force.
In doing so, I would have had to “bite the bullet” and accept the historical significance of Strategic Maritime Power upon which our Island nation has always depended for the safety and security of our trade routes and overseas possessions. However, making an honest case for the retention of some elements of Land-Based Airpower would not have been so hard to do. Logically, the immediate defence of UK airspace and the military air support of our European NATO allies was a no-brainer. Further, logistical air support of globally deployed Fleet units was another peg upon which the RAF could logically hang its hat.
When senior echelons of the Air Staff suggested, with tongue-in-cheek, that land-based RAF air power could replace the global functionality, versatility and flexibility of Carrier Battle Groups, as Chief of the Air Staff I would have reminded them of the common national cause and the associated need for truth, honesty and integrity. And I would have reminded them that the safety and security of personnel within our Royal Navy Fleet and Merchant Marine units depended upon the visible deterrence and on-site availability provided by embarked naval air power.
The case for the continued availability and utility of some elements of the Royal Air Force could easily be made, albeit signalling a significant reduction in the established number of land-based tactical fighter and support aircraft.
Lying to Ministers about the global utility of land-based tactical aircraft would have been, in my view, a non-starter – a totally unacceptable and a shameful departure from the high ground of moral rectitude and professional responsibility.
I could go on, but I think you will have got the message already.
