“People in Glass Houses Shouldn’t Throw Stones”.

  1. The derisive comment by Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten in the Telegraph on 1 September, 2022 concerning Admiral Lord West’s article, “In Defence of Carriers”, deserves some detailed analysis. (“sir – Admiral Lord West doth protest too much, methinks.”)
  2. Here, we have an Air Chief Marshal questioning the integrity, experience and expertise of one of UK’s most recognised and successful Expeditionary Force senior officers. Lord West’s track record as a war fighter in various combat theatres is impeccable.
  3. Can we say that of ACM Wratten? Has he had the opportunity to be a war fighter and to engage the enemy more closely? Does he have any personal experience of the proven value of Carrier Battle Group expeditionary force operations? Wikipedia indicates that is not the case. It would appear that he has been a Career Staff Officer rather than a frontline combatant.
  4. Let me examine that Career more closely. For decades, RAF Staff Work within MOD/Air has been excellent. But the record shows that its intent has been far from the Joint Service interest. Instead, its focus has been in support of an Institutionally Driven Campaign to deny the Fleet at sea a robust global air defence capability. Even now and behind the scenes, MOD/Air is opposing the procurement of an adequate number of F-35B fighter aircraft for the full establishment of embarked air groups in our new carriers. This misguided initiative is directly against UK’s National Security Interest. Tongue-in-cheek criticism of Lord West’s support for that Interest is, to say the least, ill-advised and regrettable.
  5. Some of the Air Chief Marshal’s publicized Staff appointments are addressed below.
  6. In June 1982, following the surrender of the Argentine Falklands invasion force, Wratten was appointed Group Captain Commanding RAF Stanley. He was given a staff including 3 Wing Commanders, numerous more junior officers and 400 engineering ratings – all supposedly needed for the routine maintenance of just 6 RAF Harrier GR 3’s. (Such gross over-manning is symptomatic of the poor utilization and management of air engineering resources at our land-based UK military airfields.) Meanwhile, the Sea Harriers of HMS Invincible, relieved by HMS Illustrious, continued to provide the air defence of the Islands. The Air Force had arrived down South in numerical strength but only after “the horse had bolted”. Wratten and team played no part in the memorable Falklands Air War Victory. Any implied suggestion otherwise is misleading.
  7. Later, as an Air Vice Marshal, he was Air Commander British Forces Middle East from 17 November 1990 until the end of the Gulf War. Desert Storm did little to enhance the reputation of the RAF as a potent fighting force. That is not to say that he did not do his best with the hand dealt to him:
    1. The Tornado F3 fighter aircraft was dispatched to the Gulf but could not be effectively employed by the in-theatre Commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, when the latter realized that the F3 did not have a functional beyond visual range weapon system. It took no part in the establishment and enforcement of the No-Fly Zone over Iraq, and was kept clear of the Zone, conducting symbolic air defence patrols over Gulf waters and the Saudi Arabia mainland.
    2. The Tornado GR1 was also dispatched to the Gulf with its JP233 Runway Denial Weapon System. Despite courageous flying by its aircrew, 8 GR1 aircraft were rapidly lost, 7 during delivery of the JP233. There were unconfirmed reports in the Telegraph that the GR1 aircrew were, quite understandably, refusing to fly further JP233 missions. As a result, the £10 billion JP233 weapon was summarily withdrawn from service and the GR1 aircraft reverted to relatively inaccurate and unproductive high level iron bomb missions.
    3. When “Stormin Norman” asked the RAF for Nimrod MPA support in the Gulf to carry out mine detection missions, he was informed that this resource was unavailable owing to “conflicting operational demands”. At the same time, up to 20 Nimrod MPA aircraft were suddenly engaged in irrelevant merchant ship tracking exercises between the UK and Gibraltar.
  8. The Wikipedia article does not appear to indicate that the Air Chief Marshal has played an active successful role in any other expeditionary force combat operations, which are indeed the bread and butter of UK’s Strategic Maritime Policy. What the article does relate is as follows:

“In 1995, following the Chinook Helicopter Crash on the Mull of Kintyre, Wratten was the Senior Reviewing Officer of the Board of Inquiry which had failed to find a cause of the accident. Despite a lack of Accident Data Recorder and cockpit voice recorder, Wratten concluded that because the aircraft hit the ground whilst in cloud/fog, pilot error was the cause of the crash and found the pilots guilty of gross negligence. Following a subsequent Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry and House of Commons Public Accounts Committee report, a House of Lords Select Committee was appointed to consider all the circumstances surrounding the crash and unanimously concluded “that the reviewing officers were not justified in finding that negligence on the part of the pilots caused the aircraft to crash.”

Perhaps MOD/Air should have appointed a Senior Reviewing Officer with a hands-on aviation background rather than a Career Staff Officer?

Conclusion

  1. In the light of all the above, one could say that the Air Chief Marshal, himself, “doth protest too much”.
  2. Teething problems with the introduction to service of our 2 new capital warships, our aircraft carriers, had to be expected but they do not negate the relevance and importance of these warships to:
    1. UK’s Power Projection capability,
    2. The global air defence of the Fleet (which the RAF cannot provide), and to
    3. The important contribution that they can and will make to the global Allied policing of international waters in conjunction with our major ally, the United States Navy.
  3. Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten’s criticism of Lord West’s article would therefore appear to be disingenuous, and part of the Institutionally Driven Campaign referred to above, at paragraph 4.

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