The parlous state of the UK’s Military Flying Training System (MFTS) has now been recognised by our Defence Secretary and is an indictment of abysmal RAF management practices today and for decades past. These practices have directly undermined UK’s National Security, particularly in relation to Global Power Projection in defence of our Island nation trade and energy supplies. Earlier reported remarks by our current Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin (when he was First Sea Lord) that the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Michael Wigston, “is a nice guy and we get on well together” demonstrates a dangerous acquiescence to having the “wool pulled over his eyes”: does he not have a firm grasp of the RAF’s long-term record of failing to honour interservice agreements and its inability to answer the strategic call?
Here are a few pointers for CDS and our Defence Secretary. They indicate that a much broader DOC Audit of the entire RAF needs to be made urgently:
In the 60s, the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm conducted its own fast jet, Fixed Wing flying training (and its Rotary Wing flying training). This delivered pilots to the frontline in 3 years – not the 9 years currently envisioned. Losing 6 years of valuable frontline pilot expertise is untenable in terms of operational and financial cost. (A workable solution for the Royal Navy is presented at para 6 below.)
In the 70s, procurement of about 320 Tornado aircraft was approved.
Of these, approximately 170 were the fighter variant, ADV – at a cost of £42 million per aircraft. Despite investment of further billions of pounds sterling, this aircraft did not have a functional beyond visual range weapon system until well after the end of the Cold War – as a result it provided no deterrence or capability against the Soviet air threat to our homeland base. Its lack of capability was studiously hidden from Ministers but was recognised by General Norman Schwarzkopf during Desert Storm, where it took no part in the policing of the Iraqi no-fly zone. It has proven to be a complete waste of taxpayers’ money.
147 Low-Level Ground Attack and Reconnaissance Tornadoes (GRs) were approved – at a cost of £37 million per aircraft and in parallel with the JP 233 runway denial weapon (the latter at a cost of £10 billion). This aircraft/weapon system combination was deployed in Desert Storm leading to the loss of 8 Tornado aircraft, following which the JP 233 was discarded along with the Low-Level Ground Attack and Reconnaissance role of the aircraft. More significant waste.
By the time the Tornado GR was deployed to Afghanistan for the Close Air Support of our ground forces, 132 aircraft remained in service but only 28 were available for frontline operations. This small number of aircraft was dubbed the “Silver Fleet” by the RAF. The other 104 aircraft were in different states of disrepair or modification. At the same time, the Harrier GR 7/9 fleet of effective Close Air Support aircraft numbered 74, of which 42 were available for front line service. The Naval Fighter Wing and RAF Harriers had a “wheels off the ground” rapid response to ground support requests of just 15 minutes. When they were replaced illogically by the Tornado at the insistence of Sir Jock Stirrup, the Tornado force refused ground support requests unless they were given 24 hours’ notice. This prevented any operational effectiveness they might have had in their main role in theatre.
The Typhoon program has mirrored the mismanagement and low availability for frontline service of both Tornado programs. Initial procurement approval was for 232 Typhoon fighter aircraft. This was downgraded to 160 aircraft, and we are now informed that the fleet strength stands at 107 aircraft. As with the Tornado program, approximately two thirds of this fleet are in different stages of modification and repair leaving little more than 30 aircraft available to the frontline. This “frontline” is limited largely to over land operations in the NATO theatre and has no contribution to make to Britain’s Strategic Global Maritime Policy, including the defence of the Fleet at sea. And yet the frightening cost of the Typhoon program to the British taxpayer is now estimated to be in excess of £80 billion.
In the light of the above pointers to egregious RAF mismanagement and misdirection of major tactical fighter programs, I would implore the Defence Secretary to expand his proposed Audit to well beyond the Military Flying Training disaster that has been produced by the RAF.
The Tempest tactical fighter program in particular merits immediate attention regarding its lack of expected strategic global utility. It will have no impact at all on the Allied need to preserve freedom of the seas and to counter China’s desire for hegemony in the Indo Pacific region. The questions must be asked by UK’s Government, “What is more important to the maintenance of our Island nation global security and prosperity? Is it the expectedly mismanaged and ultra-expensive production and procurement of a yet another limited range, land-based tactical fighter? Or is it the much-needed, better directed investment in our Fleet Weapon System which would be welcomed and applauded by our major geopolitical Allies, particularly the United States?”
I would hope that the UK Naval Staff and our Chief of Defence Staff would be putting forward these questions openly within Whitehall. A cosy relationship with the RAF and the UK defence industry is not the right answer. De facto, it only breeds extortionate costs and limited capability.
Returning to the problem of having an incompetent UK Military Flying Training System, surely now is the time for the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm to have all its fixed wing pilots trained by the United States Navy – who, I am sure, would welcome such initiative. This would ensure that our 2 aircraft carriers have available a full cadré of operational pilots to man their F-35B air groups. It is pertinent to note that a shortage of fully qualified Typhoon aircrew has little measurable effect on UK’s Strategic Maritime Policy. The same cannot be said for the aircrew of our carrier air groups.
Good article Sharkey. It’s time the RAF, good old boys ‘club’ was shut down. Their efforts in the 1940s will forever be a great part of our history. But nowadays they are incapable of having a major role in the UK’s defence. It’s time to disband them, and build up the Fleet Air Arm.
Agreed, Lin. There is no real role for the RAF, the Army and the Navy are able to meet all front line military aviation needs.
The RAF has the longest ‘tail’ and the cushiest harmony rules. If not disbanded – no politician would be brave enough to make that decision, then transfer all combat pilots, navigators, and drone ‘pilots’ to the two prime forces, and leave logistic and personnel transport functions with a severely reduced RAF.
Good article Sharkey. It’s time the RAF, good old boys ‘club’ was shut down. Their efforts in the 1940s will forever be a great part of our history. But nowadays they are incapable of having a major role in the UK’s defence. It’s time to disband them, and build up the Fleet Air Arm.
Agreed, Lin. There is no real role for the RAF, the Army and the Navy are able to meet all front line military aviation needs.
The RAF has the longest ‘tail’ and the cushiest harmony rules. If not disbanded – no politician would be brave enough to make that decision, then transfer all combat pilots, navigators, and drone ‘pilots’ to the two prime forces, and leave logistic and personnel transport functions with a severely reduced RAF.