Critique of the IWM Documentary,
How Britain Won the Falklands Air War.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Lw8eWE7aQ8&ab_channel=ImperialWarMuseums

1. This misguided IWM Duxford Documentary diminishes the vital part played by the Royal Navy Fleet Weapon System without which, Operation Corporate – the recovery of the Falkland Islands in 1982, could not have taken place. That Fleet Weapon System included Aircraft Carriers, Surface Warships, Hunter Killer Submarines, Helicopters, Sea Harrier Fighter Aircraft and, not least, 3 Commando Brigade of the Royal Marines. These integrated units demonstrated the vital utility of Strategic Maritime Power Projection without which Britain would be unable to protect its global national interests, including the passage of trade and the security of our Overseas Territories.
2. The RAF’s inability to provide the Task Force with fighter air defence support, despite many earlier promises made to Ministers, was one of the key lessons of Corporate. The small number of Fleet Air Arm Sea Harrier fighter aircraft fulfilled the part that our land-based tactical fighters were unable to play. This was critical to winning the Falklands Air War and yet it is totally ignored in this Documentary.
3. Shame on IWM for an egregious attempt to rewrite history!
4. A detailed critique of the Documentary follows below.
5. Minute 00:52. Immediate pride of place has been given to the RAF Harrier, not the Sea Harrier. This shameful bias continues unabated throughout the Documentary.
6. Minute 1:06. “It was the aircraft behind me, the Harrier, and its naval cousin the Sea Harrier upon which British hopes were placed.”
7. This is misinformation at its worst. British hopes were placed entirely upon the Sea Harrier for providing adequate air defence of the Task Force Units. The RAF Harrier was a ground attack aircraft that had no part to play at all in the fighter air defence of these Units, whether the Carrier Battle Group or the Amphibious Task Group and its ground forces. Inferring otherwise is shameful propaganda that has been going on for far too long and that should not continue to be endorsed and spread by the IWM – casting immense doubt on the latter’s reputation for historical accuracy and impartiality.
8. Minute 3:21. “The first step was eliminating the Island’s most important airfield at Stanley … Denying its use would force a change of strategy for the Argentinians … but pulling off that raid would be a very difficult job.”
9. This indicates IWM’s lack of thorough research and/or its impartiality/bias. The Documentary discusses the attempts to interdict the Port Stanley airfield runway and concentrates entirely on the failed Vulcan missions. It studiously ignores the Carrier Battle Group’s on-site resources that were used to harass and interdict the various weapon systems on the airfield, which included antiaircraft guns, Pucaras, light aircraft capable of delivering bombs, etc. The Battle Group’s resources included Naval Gunfire Support from surface warships and air attack by embarked Sea Harrier aircraft – both of which were used to good effect on the morning of 1 May.
10. The embarked Fleet Air Arm Air Warfare Instructors had advised the command that permanent interdiction of the Port Stanley runway would require a massive bombing effort and that any craters created on the runway would be rapidly repaired. This view was supported by the deductions of the RAF planning team back in the UK who suggested that not less than 20 Vulcan bomber attacks would be needed to achieve temporary interdiction and prevention of runway use.
11. With this knowledge in hand, the 800 Squadron Sea Harrier attack against Port Stanley airfield and Goose Green on May 1 delivered weapons designed to destroy thin-skinned targets, mobile weapon systems, aircraft and personnel. These weapons included Cluster Bombs Units and the Aden Cannon, and they achieved the desired result.
12. My earlier Insight, “4th of April 40 years on – The IWM Documentary Perspective”, briefly addresses the Black Buck Vulcan mission failures but now let me summarize their lack of achievement.
    1. The 3 Vulcan bombing missions delivered 63 1,000-pound bombs.
    2. 62 of these missed the runway entirely.
    3. One bomb cratered the side of the runway, the damage being repaired within 24 hours.
    4. The Vulcan follow on missions delivering the Shrike antiradar missile were also abject failures, destroying just one mobile antiaircraft system and causing an international diplomatic incident when one aircraft landed in Rio de Janeiro with the Shrike missile still on board.
    5. The Documentary’s suggestion, that the Vulcan raids persuaded the Argentine high command to move a significant part of their fighter resources from the South to protect Buenos Aires, is totally without foundation and must be regarded as shameful propaganda. All of Argentina’s respected military historians have condemned this as disinformation/misinformation.
13. It is telling that this Documentary heaps praise on the Vulcan aircrew for their time in the cockpit. Yes, they were long flights but not much longer than some flights flown regularly by civilian passenger aircraft. And like their civilian counterparts, they were not standing into serious danger: the RAF insisted that the missions could only take place if the Task Force units stood down their air defence weapon systems (Weapons Tight) and the Sea Harrier provided fighter air defence when the Vulcan was over the target area.
14. Minute 3:38 to 6:19. Nearly three minutes spent on glorifying the Vulcan effort. This emphasis does not fit well with the Documentary title, “How Britain won the Falklands Air War”. De facto, the Vulcan raids had zero effect on the Air War – the same is true of the small number of RAF Harrier GR3 aircraft. The Air War was won by:
    1. The Sea Harrier shooting down 25 enemy aircraft (without sustaining any losses in air combat) and deterring many Argentine air raids from attacking the Amphibious Task Group in San Carlos Water, and,
    2. Royal Navy warships shooting down a similar number of attacking enemy fighter bombers.
15. Minute 6:50 to 7:03. The Documentary devoted just 13 seconds to the “first air to air battles over the Falklands” (about one tenth of the time devoted to the Vulcan initiative). It does not recognise that the combat victories on May 1^st were the very reason why Argentine fighter and attack aircraft avoided contact and combat with the Sea Harrier throughout the war – a major tactical error that handed the Task Force eventual victory. During these dog fights, Sea Harrier supremacy was fully demonstrated in keeping with its pre-war pedigree against the best that the West had to offer (and of which the Argentine pilots were fully aware). Instrumental in these combat victories were:
    1. Extraordinary aircraft serviceability and availability as provided by the dedicated maintenance crews and engineers of the Sea Harrier squadrons.
    2. Outstanding pilot aircraft handling.
    3. Fully worked-up fighter combat tactics.
    4. Well-practised close coordination within Sea Harrier combat pairs.
    5. Expert knowledge and handling of the aircraft’s Blue Fox radar and full weapon system during combat.
16. The Sidewinder AIM-9L missile contributed to this success but it was not the key element in that success, as suggested in the Documentary. Paras 11, a to d, above, were the essential tools enabling the following air to air kills on May 1^st.
    1. 801 squadron: autonomous, low level, lookdown Radar Intercept of 3 Mentor light attack aircraft over the sea – result: one Mentor damaged with Aden cannon when evading in cloud, followed by,
    2. 801 squadron: medium level Radar Intercept kill of 2 Mirage III fighters – the first kill of the war by Flight Lieutenant Paul Barton immediately followed by the 2^nd kill at the hands of Lieutenant Steve Thomas, followed by,
    3. 800 squadron: visual kill of a Mirage Dagger by Flight Lieutenant Bertie Penfold, followed by,
    4. 801 squadron: autonomous, low-level, lookdown Radar Intercept kill of a Canberra aircraft by Lieutenant Alan Curtis.
17. Minute 7:24 to 7:53. “Timothy Gedge, Commander 809 Sqn, Fleet Air Arm” is put forward as the Sea Harrier mouthpiece for the events of 1 May. This is, once more, misinformation that at best reflects lack of research and, at worst, a contrived attempt to rewrite history. His testimony is flawed. Gedge was not down south on the outbreak of hostilities. He did not arrive on the scene until 18 May when 809 Reinforcement Squadron was delivered to the Battle Group from SS Atlantic Conveyor and when he joined 801 Squadron in Invincible under my command. During his short time embarked he was not involved in any air-to-air combat and, indeed, according to his own accounts in the book, “Harrier 809”, rebelled against my authority and disregarded my instructions to remain at low-level when on Combat Air Patrol.
18. In command of 800 Squadron in HMS Hermes until January 1982, his main legacy was to have trained 800 Squadron pilots to distrust Sea Harrier’s Blue Fox Radar and its NAVHARS-based avionic weapon system. My pilots informed me that 800 Squadron had been spreading the word that Sharkey Ward and 801 Squadron must be lying when reporting on the excellent performance of these 2 systems. The success of the Sea Harrier weapon system by 801 Squadron on May 1, 1982, completely debunked that criticism. It was therefore, to say the least, misguided to choose Gedge as a mouthpiece for these events and, by inference, pervert the track record of the war.
19. Minute 7:53 to 8:50. In this part of the Documentary, the commentary is superficial and keeps on referring to our Sea Harrier air defence fighter as the “Harrier” (the RAF ground attack aircraft). This is no small mistake. The Documentary is entitled, “How Britain won the Falklands Air War”, and one would have expected for historical authenticity that the IWM would have paid attention to detail and given credit for the air warfare victory where it was due, to the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm fighter aircraft and the surface-to-air weapon systems in our warships. Failure to do so reflects a level of bias and little integrity.
20. Minute 8:50 to 13:31. The Documentary gives its own blinkered and somewhat limited view of the land campaign, concentrating mainly on failure rather than success.
21. Minute 13.31. “So just how did the British prevail? How did they overcome the odds in the air? The answer, at least in part, is the Harrier.“ The answer given here is once more against the backdrop of an RAF ground attack Harrier. This can only be construed as propaganda and intentional misinformation.
22. Minute 14:28. “The Sea Harriers were primarily employed in air-to-air combat protecting the task force and ground forces.” Almost as an afterthought, the Documentary winds down with some coverage being given to the real victor in the air-to-air war, the Sea Harrier. But this “coverage” is carefully balanced, one might say overwhelmed, by the continual presentation of ground attack Harrier aircraft and related commentary.
23. Minute 18:05. “… by the final weeks of the conflict British Harriers and helicopters dominated the skies over the Falklands.” This final statement, supposedly summing up the air warfare victory, is erroneous, misguided propaganda and not at all in keeping with the authenticity and integrity that one should be able to expect from the IWM Institution. Sea Harriers not Harriers dominated the skies in the air war, ably supported by the surface to air weapon systems of Her Majesty’s surface warships.