“4th of April 40 years on –
The IWM Documentary Perspective”.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1nENiXSrJY

Three Task Forces?

1. The Documentary’s introduction sets the tone with misinformation: “There were 3 Task Forces”. Not so! There was just one Task Force commanded by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, Commander in Chief Fleet. He appointed Rear-Admiral Sandy Woodward, Flag Officer Mediterranean Flotilla to command the Task Force Carrier Battle Group. He also appointed Commodore Michael Clapp to command the Task Force Amphibious Group. The appointed Land Force Commander was Major-General Jeremy Moore, Royal Marine whose Deputy, Brigadier-General Julian Thompson, was the de facto on-site Land Force Commander for most of the conflict.

Royal Navy Not Prepared?

2. Jeffreys’ opening statements concerning the Royal Navy were as follows (not verbatim):
   1. “Our 2 aircraft carriers were not entirely suited with only 20 Sea Harriers and not enough Sidewinder missiles”.
   2. “The Royal Navy was not wholly prepared for this war”.
3. If he had wished to stay true to historical fact, the Senior IWM Curator would have stated that:
   1. The Government did not anticipate the conflict, but the Royal Navy answered the call in splendid fashion and paved the way to victory.
   2. This despite the fact that the Royal Navy had been deprived of the full means for deterring this war through the lack of strategic awareness by successive Ministers of Defence and an associated lack of adequate investment in flexible Maritime Power, especially Naval Air.
4. That he didn’t do so appears to represent an inability to provide “reliable guidance and information”, the theoretical hallmark of the Imperial War Museum, as stated on their website. Was this a case of ignorance or of an undeclared bias towards the propaganda emanating from Ministry of Defence/Air? From the tone of the balance of this Documentary, I would put my money on the latter being the case. (The Academics of the King’s College London Air Warfare Group were having unwarranted influence at the highest levels of government, claiming fraudulently that UK didn’t need aircraft carriers but could rely on the global reach of the Royal Air Force. Secretary of State John Nott fell for this unjustified claim “hook, line and sinker” and did great disservice to National Security in the process.)

May 1^st, 1982.

5. The Documentary is disingenuous in its flawed description of the opening of hostilities on May 1. It presents the less than successful Vulcan attack on Port Stanley runway as being of major import. De facto, only one of the twenty-one 1,000-pound bombs delivered was on target and that only damaged the side of the runway – it did not prevent the Argentine using the runway and had no effect on the course of the air war (as confirmed by all accredited Argentine Military Historians).
6. What the Documentary completely ignored was:
   1. The intense naval gunfire bombardment of the airfield.
   2. The successful attack by Sea Harriers from HMS Hermes: 8 against Port Stanley airfield and 4 against Goose Green.
   3. 801 Sea Harrier Squadron’s full weapon system successes in air combat against Mirage IIIs and an attempted Canberra bombing attack against the Carrier Battle Group. This demonstration of air dominance did have a profound effect on the course of the air war – as admitted by the Argentine High Command.
7. This omission raises more questions about IWM’s impartiality and integrity.

“The Brits also had Exocets in their type 22 frigates”.

8. As far as I’m aware this was not the case. Pure misinformation, either intentional or through lack of research.

The Argentine Aircraft Carrier, “Vienticinco de Mayo”.

9. Jeffreys: “Had the Argentine carrier been able to launch its Skyhawk attack aircraft, this could have changed the course of the whole war.” (Not verbatim.)
10. When it suits the Documentary’s apparent agenda, the Carrier Battle Group’s outer ring of air defence as provided by Fleet Air Arm Sea Harriers receives neither mention nor credit. On the night before the Belgrano was sunk, a reconnaissance probe by a lone 801 Squadron Sea Harrier flown by Ian Mortimer positively established the position of the Argentine carrier. The supremacy of Sea Harrier over Argentine fighter bomber aircraft had already been firmly established on 1 May – notably, successfully engaging a Canberra bomber attack at low level and at long range from our Group (intentionally not mentioned in the Documentary?). Our Sea Harriers were fully ready for and capable of intercepting and preventing an attack on our Battle Group by the limited number of carrier-launched Skyhawks who, incidentally, had no stand-off weaponry. This was not “a close call” by any stretch of the imagination. To suggest that it was unfortunately indicates some level of bias and/or a lack of Naval Air Warfare expertise.

Attacks on San Carlos Water.

11. “Following the Belgrano, the Argentine offensive switched focus [from their Navy] to their Air Force [including their naval Air Force]. … Argentine aircraft were ordered to attack warships [in San Carlos Water and Falkland Sound], not landing assault ships.” (Not verbatim.)
12. Yes, their Navy did retreat to harbour, never to venture forth again, but try and tell the thousands of personnel within San Carlos at the beachhead that they were not under persistent attack by Argentine Mirage Daggers and A-4 Skyhawks! The Ring of Steel of destroyers and frigates stationed in Falkland Sound, at the orders of Commodore Michael Clapp, was there to deter attack and absorb some of the punishment intended for the amphibious vessels within San Carlos. The main intent of the Argentine was to attack and destroy our landing force. To suggest otherwise is ludicrous.
13. This statement by the Documentary displays an amazing lack of research.

Misinformation.

14. “Atlantic Conveyor was approaching San Carlos from the Northeast with the Carrier Group.”
15. “[After the impact of the Exocet missile] Atlantic Conveyor broke in half.” (Not verbatim.)
16. Neither statement is true. The SS Atlantic Conveyor was steaming within the extended formation of the Carrier Battle Group which was stationed to the east of East Falkland. She was not en route to San Carlos when she was hit. Nor did she break in half during the action.

Planning of the Ground Force Offensive.

17. Woman commentator:
    1. “By 1 June there were sufficient British troops to plan the offensive against Port Stanley.”
    2. “The plan was to land the 5^th infantry brigade to be landed to the south of Stanley at Fitzroy.”
18. These comments completely disregard the extensive and successful tactical planning already undertaken by Brigadier Julian Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade. His plan did not, in any way, suggest or include the misguided initiative by the 5^th Infantry Brigade to advance by sea to Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. It was conducted without consultation with or approval by Brigadier Thompson. It was misguided on several fronts, not least of which it put an unsupportable strain on the logistic support needed by Thompson’s main ground force thrust that was already underway towards Mount Kent and finally Port Stanley.
19. Jeffreys: “The disaster was a failure of staff work and leadership.”
20. The Curator’s remark would appear to be directed at the land force campaign as a whole and, as such, is entirely inappropriate. Brigadier Thompson’s leadership, tactical expertise and staff work were beyond reproach, and, despite unwelcome third-party interference, he was the successful prime mover in our land force victory. To even infer otherwise is totally unacceptable. Shame on IWM!

Vulnerability of Surface Ships?

21. Jeffreys: “The vulnerability of surface ships was exposed by the war and hard lessons had been learned by the British Navy.”
22. This final summary of the war by the Curator exemplifies the very poor grasp he and his team had concerning the conduct of the war and the real lessons learned from it. As such it places a question mark over the credibility and impartiality of the IWM Institution.
23. The surface ship losses must be attributed to:
    1. The failed promise of the Royal Air Force to provide fighter air defence of the Fleet at sea throughout the Global Commons.
    2. The inadequate investment in the Fleet (including the Fleet Air Arm) by the UK Government which, in itself, was a direct result of disingenuous and misguided advice to successive Governments by Ministry of Defence/Air and their tame Airpower Academics.
    3. The unavoidable exposure of surface warships to air attack when in direct support of a major amphibious landing within enemy controlled territory and air influence.
24. The Royal Navy including the Royal Marines, Royal Fleet Auxiliaries and Merchant Marine enabled a historic, magnificent victory. In doing so, it demonstrated the vital need for the Government to support and invest in a robust Strategic Maritime Policy.
25. The principal lesson learned from the Falklands War was that if we are to be able to protect our Overseas Territories, Trade and Energy Supplies and other National and Allied interests, we cannot and should not rely on or invest in a land-based tactical Air Force for the same.