“With the RAF in charge we are Sunk!”

1. As Lewis Page recently and convincingly pointed out in a Telegraph article, our new aircraft carriers are not configured or equipped to be considered true Strike Carriers.
2. But their potential has been minimised even more by the fact that the RAF owns and has operational and administrative control of the carriers’ fixed wing F-35B air groups, destined to provide the primary air defence of our carriers and the offensive capability of the same. Against all tradition and military common sense, and facilitated by the misguided influence of “Jointery”, the RAF also had a controlling voice in the design and configuration of our carriers’ flight decks and island superstructure. Proven Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm experience and expertise was given no voice in these deliberations and today we are bearing the fruits of such extraordinary omission and failed leadership.
3. On 17 November 2021, 617 Squadron RAF, embarked in HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH, suffered the loss of F-35B Lightning ZM152 (BK-18). An Inquiry into the loss of this aircraft was initiated under the helmsmanship of Air Marshal S J Shell CB OBE MA, Director General Defence Safety Authority. His Report, reference DSA DG/SI/06/21 is now published:

Service Inquiry into the loss of F-35B Lightning ZM152 (BK-18)

4. The Report is very long and much of the commentary indicates that it has been composed by those who are only familiar with the land-based safety and security procedures for combat aircraft operating from an airfield. Many of these procedures are not appropriate for 24/7 air combat operations from the deck of a carrier at sea and reflect a serious lack of the expertise necessary to ensure the safe and efficient conduct of embarked fixed wing air groups.
5. He summarises the Report’s findings in his final paragraph:

“1.6.12. With the pace of F-35 operations increasing, and the UK aspiring to continue to expand its CSG deployments, this accident delivers a timely reminder to take stock and ensure we are giving the Lightning Force the best chance of success.”

6. He must have had tongue-in-cheek when he wrote that! Why so?
7. Within preceding paragraphs including Causative Factors of the accident, the Report fails to acknowledge many truths – the lack of which renders the Report less than useful. Here are some of those truths:
   1. The lack of embarked time of 617 Squadron as a complete Unit has denied the ship and the squadron the vital hands-on training needed to work up to an efficient and safe embarked operational standard.
   2. Engineering practices and protocols for embarked operations are very different from those pertaining when shore-based at an airfield. They can only be trained for adequately and validated by extended embarked periods of the full squadron engineering support team.
   3. During flying operations from a carrier deck and when an emergency arises, there is no time for referring to written procedures whether on the bridge or in Flyco. All associated personnel should be fully conversant with all emergency procedures without having to refer to voluminous texts hidden in the depth of written orders.
   4. The physical separation of the Ship Command team, on the bridge in the forward island, from the Air Command team in Flyco, within the after island, is clearly unacceptable when an emergency arises. The Captain and the Commander Air need to be face-to-face and working as one when addressing routine flying operation conduct as well as emergencies.
   5. The Air Marshal fails to address the key issue – the lack of support from all within MOD/Air for a more rapid build-up of UK’s F-35B force. This is needed in order to establish two operationally robust and effective embarked air groups for our carriers, without which they do not represent either promised support for our major allies or a significant deterrent to those that would do us harm.
8. A Royal Navy Board of Inquiry led by an experienced Fleet Air Arm fixed wing carrier pilot and supported by a Naval Air Engineer and a Surgeon Commander would undoubtedly have addressed all these important issues and produced a more concise and relevant Report.
9. Instead of attending to these serious problems with targeted and diligent investment, our leaders in Whitehall now appear to be generating a new “Cuckoo in the nest of Defence Procurement”. We already have seen billions committed to the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), Tempest, and now we are faced with another “Cuckoo”: plans for the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).

UK headquarters planned for advanced jet fighter project of Japan, Britain, Italy – sources

10. Neither of these Programs will provide the UK with the ability to project military power and influence through deterrence beyond the NATO area – and certainly not in the Indo-Pacific region where the main threat to our security and prosperity exists. The title, Global Combat Air Programme, appears to have been chosen to mislead Ministers into thinking that the product tactical fighter aircraft will have Global reach.
11. Nothing could be further from the truth – especially if neither project produces a Carrier-capable aircraft.
12. Investment in FCAS and GCAP must now be channelled instead into our strategically mobile Fleet, including our capital warships: the two carriers and their air groups.