After 20 years and unwisely in my view, Bagram Air Base has been handed over rather precipitously to the Afghanistan government. This airfield was the initial foothold gained by the Coalition forces who were intent on defeating Al Qaeda. First on the scene in 2001 were the Royal Marine Commandos who secured the airfield. Since then the Royals have shared the UK’s ground force contribution to the containment of terrorism and militancy with the Army. The latter enjoy 10 times the personnel strength of the Royal Marines but I understand that our Commandos have shouldered a workload out of all proportion to the relatively small size of the Corps. Is there not some sense of imbalance here with regard to utility, efficiency and cost-effectiveness?
Perhaps the Defence Select Committee may wish to address that question. In doing so, the Committee may also wish to be aware of the personnel numbers on Active Duty for each of our Armed Services as at 1 April 2011 during the Libyan crisis:
A detailed Xcel spreadsheet justifying these figures is available. Today, military personnel numbers have been reduced across the board but the percentages on Active Duty remain about the same.
Now that the UK Government appears to have recognised properly our Island Nation interests, the importance of Strategic Maritime Power and the lack of Strategic Global Mobility and Utility of our land-based Tactical Air Force, is it not important that we step back and take a fresh look at the Strategic Mobility, Deployability and Utility of our Army: especially concerning personnel numbers and Cold War style Heavy Armour Brigades and Divisions with their battle tanks and heavy artillery?
Of relevance to such a review is the ongoing discussion concerning the poor state and eye-catching cost of the Ajax Armoured Vehicle program. This promotes questions about the size, justification and procurement process of this project.
As a military observer from a sister Service, albeit without specialist Army training, I would suggest that common sense and good housekeeping now needs to be brought into play.
Our Strategic Maritime Force (I like to call it the Fleet Weapon System) is robust, mobile and capable of operating globally in close coordination with our Allies. Further, its very existence provides the main element of UK political and military power projection (as with the recent Black Sea incident), of defence and of deterrence for our Island Nation. It has a convincing pedigree of success, utility and versatility.
Now compare that with the track record of substantial elements of the Army. If I’m not mistaken, the last deployment of British heavy armour outside the NATO area was for operation Desert Storm in 1991. As reported to me by my Phantom squadron boss Captain Nick Kerr RN (RIP), then part of the Defence Attaché’s team in Saudi Arabia, UK battle tanks could not keep up with the advancing armour of the United States and other allies. They could only advance at a rate of 2 ½ miles per day compared with the 50 miles (or was it 25 miles) required by “Stormin’ Norman”. According to Nick, up to 2000 tank engineers from all over Europe were flown out to remedy this but failed to give the British tanks adequate mobility in theatre. And so they were left behind, hardly taking any effective part in the engagement of Saddam Hussein’s forces.
Despite this less than illustrious heavy armour record, the details of which were hidden from the British public, the Ministry of Defence approved the procurement of the current battle tank through the same Defence Contractor as its predecessor. Has this resulted in greatly improved combat utility, mobility and serviceability? If not, why not and who is being held accountable?
Battle Tank track record apart (the investment cost of which I am not privy to), the debacle over the Ajax Armoured Vehicle program would appear to deserve scrutiny at the highest levels of government. Various historians, commentators and academics have waged a campaign against the procurement of our new aircraft carriers and the associated Strategic Maritime Policy, citing the £6.2 billion cost as the fundamental cause of their concern. Foremost amongst these critics has been one Max Hastings whose personal military pedigree does not appear to have been publicly established. Where is the same concern now from him and others over the £5.5 billion cost of the Ajax program? What will be the global utility of these vehicles – when, for example, “they represent a significant health hazard to their occupants, their speed is limited to 20 mph and they can’t reverse over an obstacle more than 8 inches high?” What is the military justification for procuring more than 500 of these vehicles? When and where will they be used in the frontline and against what perceived threat?
Importantly, the oversight of and focus on this program needs to take into account the advent in the Middle East of low cost and operationally effective anti-tank drone weapon systems which must now be of concern to all light and heavy armour aficionados. (See article below from the Wall Street Journal.)
General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, Chief of the General Staff gave an interview with Con Coughlin, Defence Editor of the Telegraph towards the end of May, 2021. Here is an extract from that interview.
“We are already seeing the implications of artificial intelligence, quantum computing and robotics, and how they might be applied on the battlefield.” As a result he believes future conflicts are more likely to be fought at greater ranges using more precise and effective weaponry. ….. And, by harnessing these new technologies to the Army’s conventional fighting skills, Sir Mark believes that it will be able to demonstrate its value as an ally of the US military, as well as being able to undertake and sustain division-strength military interventions overseas, which is the traditional benchmark of Britain’s commitment to Nato and the US.”
The emboldened text above highlights a major problem that Sir Mark failed to address. That is, the logistic inability of the UK to transport and sustain division-strength military intervention overseas, particularly heavy armour. As I understand it, such logistic capability does not exist for the rapid deployment of a heavy armour Division in response to a crisis whether overland through Europe or by sea throughout the Global Commons. Similar logistic constraints are faced by non-heavy armour brigades/divisions.
Recently, the Royal Marine Corps and the US Marine Corps have kept up with the times with regard to deployability and effectiveness in the global context. Heavy armour has, I believe, been side-lined as an option. In the context of Britain’s declared Strategic Maritime Policy, should not the Army now be reconfigured appropriately to complement that Policy and at the same time help provide some effective protection for our Island base? As things stand today, the only effective defence of the UK against cruise or ballistic missile attack is provided by the Royal Navy. If this remark makes Air Marshals stutter, see my Insight, “The Strategic Air Defence of Our Interests”.
If a prime military raison d’être of the Army is protecting the homeland base from attack, then should it not be configured more appropriately for that task? Where are the surface-to-air missile defences for the protection of military installations, power stations, dockyards and ports against ballistic missile and cruise missile attack? Such attacks may be deemed quite unlikely but, either way, tanks, heavy artillery and hundreds of armoured personnel carriers can play no part in defending against such threats. And as our Army appears to be relatively immobile in the global context, what exactly is its overall utility and cost-effectiveness?
You can only project power and influence if you can get it there.
These questions and more need to be addressed by the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office. Rather than blindly accepting the whimsical phrase, “able to undertake and sustain division-strength military interventions overseas”, these Bodies should be asking:
How are you going to get there in an emergency, e.g. to the Indo-Pacific region or to the Eastern European front?
How are you going to be supported if and when you do get there?
Why do we need such a large standing Army if it doesn’t have the means to respond rapidly to and effectively deter and/or overcome those that would harm our interests on the global stage?
It appears that critical justification and demonstration of current and future weapon system utility and effectiveness against perceived threats and of associated personnel levels needs to be demanded by our Government.
Missile-equipped drones built with affordable digital technology helped turn the tide against Russian-backed forces in Syria, Libya and Azerbaijan.
A soldier idles by a Russian-made T-72 tank. A moment later, a missile fired from a drone slams into the vehicle, exploding in an orange flash, blowing the man off his feet and leaving the tank a smouldering wreck.
The scene is one of dozens of aerial videos that were posted online in Azerbaijan last year showing off a new weapon. Over six weeks, it helped the nation regain territory in the Nagorno-Karabakh region that had been held by Russian-backed Armenian forces for more than two decades. The videos show attacks on tanks, trucks, command posts, mortar positions and radar installations.
Smaller militaries around the world are deploying inexpensive missile-equipped drones against armoured enemies, a new battlefield tactic that proved successful last year in regional conflicts, shifting the strategic balance around Turkey and Russia. Drones built in Turkey with affordable digital technology wrecked tanks and other armoured vehicles, as well as air-defense systems, of Russian protégés in battles waged in Syria, Libya and Azerbaijan.
These drones point to future warfare being shaped as much by cheap but effective fighting vehicles as expensive ones with the most advanced technology.
China, too, has become a leading war drone exporter to the Middle East and Africa. Iran-linked groups in Iraq and Yemen used drones to attack Saudi Arabia. At least 10 countries, from Nigeria to the United Arab Emirates, have used drones purchased from China to kill adversaries, defense analysts say.
“The implications are game changing,” U.K. Defense Secretary Ben Wallace said in a speech last year, citing Syria’s heavy losses to Turkish drones.
Flying alone or in a group, these drones can surprise troops and disable poorly concealed or lightly defended armored vehicles, a job often assigned to expensive warplanes. The drones can stay quietly aloft for 24 hours, finding gaps in air-defense systems and helping target strikes by warplanes and artillery, as well as firing their own missiles.
Militaries, including the U.S., are upgrading air-defense systems to catch up with the advances, seeking methods to eliminate low-budget drones without firing missiles that cost more than their targets.
The U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory is also developing Skyborg and Valkyrie, lower-cost autonomous aircraft that are part of an innovation program. “Our adversaries are already fielding technologies that will hold our legacy platforms at risk,” an Air Force official said in a statement.
Israel and the U.S. have long used high-end drones in counterterrorism operations to target prominent enemies. But the countries have hesitated to sell their top models, even to allies, for fear of proliferation.
Responding to drone deals that China and other producers have struck with countries shunned by the U.S., the Trump administration last July relaxed its export policy somewhat, potentially boosting sales of more capable models than previously allowed. The United Arab Emirates said in January it had agreed to buy 18 U.S.-made MQ-9 drones for nearly $3 billion.
Technological advances and global competitors have produced inexpensive alternatives. The standard-bearer of the latest armed-drone revolution emerged last year on the battlefields around Turkey, the Bayraktar TB2.
Compared with the American MQ-9, the TB2 is lightly armed, with four laser-guided missiles. Its radio-controlled apparatus limits its basic range to around 200 miles, roughly a fifth of the ground the MQ-9 can cover.
Yet it is utilitarian, and reliable—qualities reminiscent of the Soviet Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle that changed warfare in the 20th century. A set of six Bayraktar TB2 drones, ground units, and other essential operations equipment costs tens of millions of dollars, rather than hundreds of millions for the MQ-9.
The drone’s Turkish producer, Baykar, which started in 1984 making auto parts, boasts of more bang for the buck. Qatar and Ukraine are customers. Poland, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member, said last month it would buy 24 TB2 drones. Several other NATO allies are interested, as well as countries in Africa and Asia, Turkish government and company officials said.
Turn the tide
The TB2 drone gained international notice in the skies over Syria in early 2020.
Toward the end of February, the Syrian regime, backed by Russia, was advancing on the city of Idlib, which was held by rebels supported by Turkey. After an air raid killed more than 30 Turkish soldiers, Turkey embarked on Spring Shield, an operation that integrated drones with electronic warfare systems, ground troops, artillery and warplanes.
The drones, quiet and hard to spot on radar, flew for hours seeking gaps in air-defense systems, which fell “like domino tiles” once breached, said Haluk Bayraktar, chief executive of Baykar. The vehicles operated in groups of a dozen or so to attack targets simultaneously, Turkish government and company officials said.
Ismail Demir, head of Turkey’s state body overseeing the defense industry, said the low cost of these drones allows military forces to take more risks with them. “If you lose one, two, three,” he said, it doesn’t matter as long as others find a target.
Last spring, the TB2s helped turn the tide in the Libyan civil war for the Tripoli-based government, which is backed by the United Nations.
Turkey had sent arms in 2019 to stem an assault on the capital by militia leader Khalifa Haftar, who is supported by Russia and others. In 2020, Turkey increased military support. Improved drone tactics honed in Syria provided the upper hand against Russian-made surface-to-air missile systems known as Pantsir, handing the Tripoli government aerial supremacy. By June, Mr. Haftar’s forces retreated from Tripoli.
The success of the drones has helped Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, an at-times fractious U.S. ally, to expand his regional influence without risking significant numbers of troops or costly equipment.
While Turkey’s enhanced capabilities may benefit NATO, fellow members worry that the ability of Mr. Erdogan to deploy and sell drones could embolden his assertive pursuit of a more independent foreign and security policy.
“The U.S., like a lot of European partners, is leery of Turkey’s drone exports and the aggressive way Turkey has been using drones in these conflicts,” said Dan Gettinger, a researcher at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, a nonpartisan policy research group in Arlington, Va.
Mike Nagata, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general in special operations, said drones were “part of a much larger challenge regarding the future of the relationship between Turkey and the United States and NATO.”
Bloodied ground
Ukraine signed a deal in January 2019 to buy TB2 drones from Turkey, receiving at least six so far, and Kyiv is in talks for joint production. A Ukrainian company is manufacturing engines for the latest Baykar drone, a larger model with a heavier payload than the TB2.
The country hopes the drones will discourage a repeat of the Kremlin’s 2014 invasions. “They allow us to deter Russian aggression or to retaliate if they invade,” said Yuriy Mysyagin, deputy head of the defense committee in Ukraine’s Parliament. “We saw how they performed last year.”
Ukraine’s military in March posted details of flight-training over the Black Sea some 50 miles from Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. The Defense Ministry declined to comment further.
Turkey’s drone sales have riled Moscow. Citing rising Turkish Covid-19 cases, Russia in April suspended most air travel between the two countries through June 1, starving Turkey of Russian tourists who visit during May holidays. Russia this week extended the suspension three weeks.
Erdogan told Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky during an April meeting in Turkey that Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened to extend the flight ban unless Turkey pulls back from its drone sales and support to Ukraine, according to a person briefed on the conversation.
Neither the Kremlin nor the Russian Defense Ministry responded to requests for comment.
Turkish officials say they aren’t seeking conflict with Russia by taking on its allies. Turkey has close energy ties with Moscow, and it purchased an advanced Russian air-defense system, leading to sanctions from the U.S.
The TB2 was born of Turkey’s dissatisfaction with available models from the U.S. and Israel, and the country’s desire for systems under its control to fight the PKK, a Kurdish militant group.
“Those countries did not cooperate with us sufficiently, so we had to launch our own program,” Mustafa Varank, Turkey’s minister of industry and technology, said in an interview. “Turkey is now reaping the fruits of taking the right decisions at the right time.”
Baykar emerged as a leader among several Turkish drone producers after spotting a niche in the early 2000s, said Mr. Bayraktar, the company’s chief executive. His brother Selcuk Bayraktar, who took advanced studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, came up with flight-control software and guidance systems while using off-the-shelf components.
During development, company officials set up a workshop at a military base to get a firsthand understanding, including from a colonel who took them to a patch of bloodied ground where, they said, Turkish soldiers were killed by the PKK.
In 2007, Turkey launched a national competition to supply mini drones, which yielded an order of 76 from Baykar. At the time, the U.S. wouldn’t sell armed drones to Turkey. Baykar developed the TB2 and gradually replaced foreign components with locally produced ones. In 2015, the company successfully test-fired a precision-guided munition.
Turkey’s military initially used the drones within its own borders and in northern Iraq and Syria. Soon, Mr. Erdogan deployed them in wars near Turkey’s borders.
Azerbaijan, geographically and culturally close to Turkey, procured a set of TB2 drones last year. The country had lost control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Armenia in a war that ended in a 1994 cease-fire. Rising petroleum wealth had bolstered Azerbaijan’s military in the years since.
The TB2s, as well as Israeli-made drones, helped Azerbaijan overwhelm Armenian forces. Attacks were recorded for videos and posted online by Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry.
Oryx, a blog that verifies destroyed equipment using photos and videos, cited the destruction by the drones of 106 Armenian tanks, 146 artillery pieces, 62 multiple rocket-launch systems, 18 surface-to-air missile systems, seven radar units and 161 other vehicles. Total losses, Oryx noted, were likely higher. Azerbaijan had 30 tanks destroyed, among other vehicles and equipment, according to the blog.
After six weeks of fighting, the Kremlin, which is close to both countries but has a military alliance with Armenia and troops on its territory, brokered a cease-fire in November, and Azerbaijan regained most of its long-lost territory.
The Azerbaijan victory caught the attention of Turkey’s suppliers. Some companies and countries, including Canada, halted export of components used in the TB2. Baykar company officials said they have integrated a Turkish camera and accelerated work on a replacement engine, which is expected by year’s end.
At a December victory parade in Baku, Azerbaijan’s capital, Mr. Erdogan sat next to his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, on a dais lined with Turkish and Azerbaijani flags. Triumphal music blared. When a phalanx of trucks carrying TB2 drones passed, Mr. Aliyev nodded and smiled.
