The Strategic Air Defence of Our Interests

With the Integrated Defence Review heralding a revived Strategic Maritime Policy, a robust defence of our Fleet under the sea, on the sea surface and above the sea is vital for the global deterrence of those that would harm our Interests. Fortunately, the Fleet’s versatility, deployability and ability to assist in the policing of the Global Commons is equally pertinent for the direct protection of our Homeland base from attack by military weapons systems.

This blog addresses the need for the Strategic Air Defence of our Interests. Precise commentary on satisfying that need is provided below.

MEMORANDUM

This Memorandum is Supported by:

Dr. Anthony R Wells, Head of Special Programs, a UK Intelligence directorate, 1979-1983. Author of: A Tale of Two Navies, and, Between Five Eyes.
Rear-Admiral Jeremy Larken DSO, HMS FEARLESS, Falklands 82 – CSO to Commander Amphibious Battle Group; COMAW 1986-87; ACDS (Overseas) 1988-90.
Rear-Admiral Dr. Chris Parry CBE PhD, Falklands 82: HMS ANTRIM, Helicopter Observer, South Georgia. Commanded HMS GLOUCESTER 1993-95, Maritime Warfare Centre 1997-99, HMS FEARLESS 2000-01 and the UK’s Amphibious Task Group 2004-05. Author of “Down South” – his best-selling War Diary.
Commodore Michael Clapp CB RN, Commander Amphibious Force, Falklands 82.
Commodore Jamie Miller CBE DL RN, COMATG 2001-2003: HMS. COVENTRY 1982.
Captain Colin Hamilton RN, CO HMS LEEDS CASTLE 82.
Captain James Luard RN, Air Engineer Officer of NP 1990 during Op Corporate.
Captain Stewart Thompson RN, HMS FEARLESS 1982.
Captain Gordon Wilson RN, Head of Defence Studies (Navy) 1987-1993.
Colonel Richard Preston RM, Military adviser and SF coordinator to Admiral Woodward and from the end of May, Chief of Staff to General Moore.
Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour OBE RM, Falklands War 1982.
Commander Tony Backhouse RN, Defence Policy and Nuclear Staff 1987-1990 and Strategic Systems Executive 1990-1993.
Commander Graham Edmonds RN, HMS BROADSWORD 1982.
Commander Paul Fisher BSC (Hons) ARCS RN, MoD DOR(Sea) T45 and Strike Carrier Operational Requirement sponsor, Commanded HMS EDINBURGH 1995-1997, CTG Armilla Patrol 1996, BAES Strike Carrier Bid Team Combat Systems lead.
Commander David A Hobbs MBE RN, Naval Historian and Author.
Commander Laon Hulme OBE RN, HMS BRILLIANT, Falklands 82.
Commander Chris Hunneyball RN, Staff Aviation Officer, Carrier Battle Group, Falklands.
Lieutenant Commander Lester May RN – HMS HYDRA, Falklands War 1982.
Major David Jeremy, retired Army Liaison Officer with FAA and RAF.

The Strategic Air Defence of our Interests.

References:

1. 1. GLOBAL BRITAIN IN A COMPETITIVE AGE – The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, March 2021.
   2. CP 411 – DEFENCE IN A COMPETITIVE AGE, March 2021.

Executive Summary.

1. UK interests in the Global Commons are vulnerable to interference. Successful deterrence is within the purview of the Fleet Weapon System.
2. Range-restricted land-based tactical fighters have zero global deterrence value and negligible combat air defence capability in the maritime environment.
3. The recent dependence on a tactical Air Force that does not have true global reach is the Achilles Heel of recent political advice to defence planning.
4. Redirecting more funding to maritime-based airpower from land-based airpower would result in major savings and a verifiable increase in the U.K.’s Strategic Capabilities.

Introduction.

1. UK’s Lifeblood is provided by Sea-Borne Commercial Trade and Energy Supplies. These and our Undersea Communications Cables, Overseas Territories and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) need protection. That is the purpose of the Royal Navy. Defence agreements with the Commonwealth underpin that purpose. UK’s commitment to NATO remains essential alongside our other global defence requirements.

2. These demand the mobility, flexibility and versatility of Strategic Military Power to deter/overcome those that threaten our interests. Historically, this has been provided by our “Fleet Weapon System”, embracing the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Royal Fleet Auxiliary. This provides the Continuous At Sea Deterrent (Trident) and Conventional Military Strength under, on and above the sea.

3. These three constituents are inter-dependent and vital to the operational effectiveness of the Fleet Weapon System for defence and deterrence as well as offence. For example, “under the sea” our nuclear submarine hunter-killers (SSNs) are complementary to Carrier Battle Groups providing tactical defence (ASW Tigerfish) and a flexible deep strike element (Tomahawk).

4. The final statement at Reference B, “We are working to strengthen our mechanisms to drive and assure value for money”, is key to the effective conduct of our Strategic Maritime Policy. A state-of-the-art weapon system can only be deemed “value for money” if it is capable of rapid and sustained deployment in direct support of our global needs.

5. For example, the Tempest Concept (referred to in Reference B) for a sixth-generation tactical fighter must be fully carrier-capable if it is to be a cost-effective investment. The Requirement and Specification for this program (as referred to in CP 411) would therefore appear to demand careful scrutiny.

6. Neither Reference A nor B addresses one key issue that could prove to be the Achilles Heel of all our joint endeavours.

GPS Redundancy and Inertial Navigation System (INAS) Quality Backup.

7. Reliance on GPS for practically all weapons platforms would appear to be misguided and dangerous. Anti-satellite weapons threaten the effective functioning of the GPS system. There is an urgent need for a reversionary INAS-level capability to be provided for all dependent military assets.

Background.

8. In the 1960s, the UK Nuclear Deterrent was transferred to our Submarine Force and Naval Buccaneer aircraft assumed the role of tactical nuclear bombing. These 2 events removed from the RAF the last vestiges of Strategic Military Power. It became a Tactical Air Force without any flexible Strategic Maritime reach. Its very existence was therefore seen to be under threat. This led to one of the most disingenuous PR campaigns in history.

9. The RAF persuaded Ministers that it could replace U.K.’s Strike Carriers and provide all the air support needed for the Strategic Maritime task, claiming global reach for their short-range, tactical air defence fighters. This claim was not and could not be demonstrated. It has been discredited convincingly by such events as the Falklands War and has jeopardised our National Security.

10. RAF Expeditionary Air Wing (EAW) operations have proved poor substitutions for Carrier Strike Group deployability and versatility and were non-cost-effective. The Libyan affair and then Operation ‘Shader’ in Syria and Iraq devoured more than £5.4 billion, killing over 4,000 jihadis – at £1.3 million per head!

The Strategic Arena.

11. The Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans have an area of 124,000,000 square miles. (Arctic and Southern Oceans are not considered in this paper, even though the Arctic is fast becoming an area of strategic importance and relevance to maritime forces.) This oceanic Global Commons allows free extra-national movement of military and merchant shipping outside territorial zones of interest.

12. If a mainland base in the Indo-Pacific region was available for land-based fighters to provide 24/7 air defence for a Maritime Task Force or a Merchant Shipping lane/choke point out to say a radius of 300 miles (even this capability has never been demonstrated), this would provide localised coverage of just 140,000 square miles. This represents just 0.001% of the navigable oceans of the world.

13. Today, Britain’s Sovereign Bases outside the NATO area are limited to 2 Islands in the South Atlantic (Ascension and the Falklands – separated by 3500 nautical miles) and one Island off the southern coast of India (Diego Garcia). The vast areas of ocean away from, surrounding and dwarfing these bases cannot be policed and protected by land-based fighter aircraft. East of Suez, air base approval is difficult to acquire and facilities are extremely limited in availability – virtually none in the Asia-Pacific region, the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the littoral coast of the African continent. U.K.’s land-based tactical fighters have zero deterrence value and negligible combat air defence capability in these distant but vital trade route locations.

14. Recent UK dependence on a tactical Air Force that does not have true global/strategic reach has therefore been the Achilles Heel of recent political advice to defence planning. Modest reinvestment in the Fleet-in-being would redress this lacuna and support declared Strategic Maritime Policy.

Why did the MoD/Air perpetrate this fraudulent and dangerous “spin”?

15. The demise of Bomber Command when the then Government decided to use a Continuous At Sea Deterrent brought into question the very existence of an independent Air Force. This existence was further challenged by the Government’s decision to scrap air-launched nuclear weapons in the 1980s. One may reasonably suggest therefore that in 1967 the RAF misled the Government in order to provide themselves with a strategic raison d’être and to sustain their continued existence as an individual Armed Service.

16. The words of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Trenchard, when he heard about the possibility of a third new Service are pertinent:

“A service beyond control of the Army and Navy would be very liable to lose its sense of proportion and be drawn towards the spectacular.”
and,
“The RAF should last for 50 years and then revert to its initial owners.”

In order to counter this militarily logical view, the RAF resorted to a sustained propaganda campaign glorifying World War II accomplishments such as the Battle of Britain and the Dam Buster Raids. In the absence of any major global success since the 1940s, they presented to the public the new face of the Royal Air Force, i.e. The Red Arrows. The most disingenuous and dishonest claim since the 1960s has been that “the RAF won the air war over the Falklands”.

17. If an Armed Service has to:
    1. Depend on Public Relations and misinformation,
    2. Refer to its distant World War II past,
    3. Actively fund and maintain a major presence in fields such as Academia,
       Then:
    4. The case for its independent existence in today’s world is questionable.

Discussion.

18. Trenchard’s early prediction has come home to roost in spectacular fashion. All sense of proportion appears to have been lost with the behind-the-scenes influence of the RAF ensuring that, just since 1979, an inflation linked sum of £350 billion (nearly £9 billion per annum) has been invested in land-based, non-carrier capable military aircraft that do not have any effective maritime combat reach beyond the immediate NATO European area. This lack of Strategic utility was demonstrated in British Honduras (Belize), the Falklands, Sierra Leone and practically all other offshore interventions since World War II, including Korea and Borneo.

19. In contrast and since 1979, an inflation linked sum of just £20 billion has been invested in carrier-borne aircraft. But it was the latter that secured our strategic national interests and deterred those that would harm us in all the aforesaid crises. Argentina would never have invaded the Falklands in 1982 if UK had maintained its conventional Strike Carrier Force.

The Conduct and Cost of operating the Typhoon alongside the F-35B – as obliquely referred to within Reference B.

20. It is understood that
    1. our F-35’s state-of-the-art communications system cannot link up with older planes, including the Typhoon and that
    2. an attempt to modify the F-35 to resolve this issue is being considered but at considerable cost and delays of up to five years.

21. Such possible modification needs to be validated and justified in terms of value for money. Questions arising include:
    1. When, if ever, would the non-stealth Typhoon be operating in company with the carrier-borne F-35B in defence of our overseas trade routes, possessions and energy supplies?
    2. Is it not illogical to suggest that the F-35B stealth fighter should conduct composite missions with the non-stealth Typhoon, thereby effectively negating the F-35B stealth qualities?
    3. In the light of a. and b. above, is it not irresponsible to suggest that the F-35B program should suffer major delays and costs in order to be modified to communicate covertly with the Typhoon?

22. Surely, we as an Island Nation should concentrate our limited defence funds on the strategic capability of the F-35B when embarked in carriers and not prejudice the same with delays and unjustified expenditure on communication with a land-based, noncarrier-capable, non-stealth, limited utility, tactical fighter.

The Advent of Drone Warfare.

23. Drones and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) now represent a part of the Military Arsenal that is available to all Armed Forces throughout the world. But, like Tactical Airpower, it is a “bit part” that can only be truly effective in combat or high tension if it is available to and maintained under the Operational and Tactical Control of our Strategic Maritime and Land Forces in a combat theatre. Shipborne and battlefield drones would therefore appear to be an optimum way ahead especially for global operations.

24. Some might claim that the long reach of the larger, expensive drones (rivalling in cost the F-18 Super Hornet aircraft) will have considerable deterrence value. The relatively recent event when Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz to all commercial traffic confounds this claim. The threat of retaliation through the medium of the United States Strategic Bomber Force had no effect whatsoever on Iran’s intentions. But when the first United States Strike Carrier moved into area, the Iranians immediately backed down and sought diplomatic negotiations.

25. The belief that U.K.’s Military Drones should be under the operational control of the distant land-based Tactical Air Force must be discredited. Task Force Commanders in Theatre need to have full operational and tactical control – as with all supporting weapons platforms including the F-35B and any development from the Tempest Concept.

The “Crunch”.

26. Despite all the above, MoD/Air has been working hard behind closed doors to persuade Ministers that, instead of buying an operationally sustainable number of F-35B carrier-borne fighter aircraft, the Government should spend more money on limited-range, non-carrier-capable fighter aircraft – as iterated at Reference B in discussions concerning the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). Expensive Typhoon modifications will not in any way increase the strategic utility and global deterrence value of this aircraft. The efficacy of MoD/Air’s initiatives including FCAS need to be carefully examined in accordance with Reference A’s intent:

“… to gather perspectives on the UK’s role in the world over the next ten years, UK capabilities in relevant areas, and the extent to which current systems support their effective use.”

27. The severe strategic operational limitations of Typhoon will apply to any non-carrier-capable replacement aircraft including the Tempest Concept. The Spending Review 2020 Commitment to “Developing the Future Combat Air System for the RAF, along with delivering upgraded Typhoon radars” as given at Reference A does not fit well with these limitations and considerations.

28. With Brexit negotiations having been successfully concluded, a major grey area of doubt has been cast over the quality and reliability of continued military cooperation with our European partners. This could well adversely affect:
    1. the utility and deployability of our land-based tactical fighter resources in support of the NATO European area, and
    2. the execution, supportable cost and operationally-effective conclusion of such collaborative military ventures as the Tempest Concept. The question needs to be asked “Will our European partners sanction full carrier-borne capability in the Specification for this weapon system’s development?”

29. When addressing the above issues, our Policy Makers in Whitehall should scrutinize the true availability of the Typhoon fleet for fully-fledged combat operations. Only about 25% of this fleet (and possibly much less) is fully fitted and available for such operations. With defence procurement being scrutinised for cost and operational value and as an example, the following questions arise:
    1. Will the Typhoon fleet be rationalised with less than 50 combat-ready airframes being available 24/7 to the frontline for UK/NATO defence?
    2. Why do we need seven frontline Typhoon squadrons now (as given at Reference B) when just one Phantom squadron was used to satisfy the Quick Reaction Alert function for the defence of UK airspace during the Cold War?

Reference B does not address 29. b.

30. Unjustifiable diversion of funding away from the F-35B and the Fleet Weapon System would cause irreparable harm to Britain’s Strategic Military and Political Power Projection capability, to confidence placed in us by our Allies and to the global protection and, if necessary, defence of our Lifeblood that may be vital after Brexit. It is reassuring that Reference B indicates a commitment to increase the size of the F-35B fleet beyond 48 units, catering for more realistic, larger embarked air groups.

31. Such a diversion of funding may already have been initiated by MoD/Air: suggesting that 12 F-35C aircraft should be procured. This aircraft variant is incapable of operating from the Queen Elizabeth Class of carrier. Should there be a plan to convert the flight deck of one or both of our carriers to “cat and trap” then that would be the time to consider EITHER the F-35C or the F-18 Super Hornet and Super Growler (the latter being vital for the Defence Suppression need).

32. The Fleet Weapon System is U.K.’s truly Strategic Force. Targeted investment in this Force rather than tactical airpower should result in a tangible increase in funding for U.K.’s Military and Political Power Projection capability, deterrence and the enhanced security of our Lifeblood.

Recommendations.

33. Maritime Task Force and Land Force Commanders in a combat theatre need to have both Operational and Tactical control of all supporting weapons platforms and systems.

34. Implications regarding the over-reliance on GPS for weapon platform and system effectiveness should be urgently addressed and solutions found.

Conclusions.

35. UK interests in the Global Commons are vulnerable to interference. Successful deterrence is within the purview of the Fleet Weapon System.

36. Range-restricted land-based tactical fighters have zero global deterrence value and negligible combat air defence capability in the maritime environment.

37. The recent dependence on a tactical Air Force that does not have true global reach is the Achilles Heel of recent political advice to defence planning.

38. Redirecting more funding to maritime-based airpower from land-based airpower would result in major savings and a verifiable increase in the U.K.’s Strategic Capabilities.