“RAF Combat Force Integration.”

1. “Packing a Punch”. The article by Alan Warnes in “Air Forces Monthly, Dec 2022” discusses the potential of the RAF’s fighter force with Air Commodore Mike Baulkwill, the RAF’s Combat Air Force Commander.

The Postulated Theory.

2. “He [the Air Commodore] is responsible for the F-35 Lightning Force at RAF Marham and the two squadrons there, and all the Typhoon squadrons at RAF Coningsby and RAF Lossiemouth, also the RAF Red Arrows and the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight.” [Question. I hear that when the Hawk T1s were withdrawn from service, those at 736 Naval Air Squadron, Culdrose were handed over to the Red Arrows. 736 Squadron had an important operational training role. The Red Arrows do not! Why then, Combat Air Force Commander, were the Red Arrows aircraft not transferred to 736 Squadron to enable the continuation of operational training?]
3. “When the E-7A Wedgetail AEW (airborne early warning and control) aircraft arrives next year, it will become the fifth finger – alongside the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning, BAE Systems Typhoon FGR4, Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joint and Boeing P-8A Poseidon in a fist that could launch a big punch. Integrating them together is now a main priority and much of that focus over the past few years has been on the F-35B Lightning and Typhoon.”

My Commentary: Questionable Assertions.

4. There are some questionable assertions/statements within the above and within the article itself that do not fit well with the declared Strategic Military Policy of the United Kingdom, at the heart of which lie our two new aircraft carriers.
5. Surprisingly, the “potential of the RAF’s [tactical] fighter force” for supporting global maritime Expeditionary Force Operations is not mentioned, presumably because only U.K.’s F-35B Lightnings are deployable for such operations.
6. The Typhoon cannot operate from aircraft carriers and is limited to relatively short-range operations from land bases – and such land bases are in short supply east of Suez. Its utility for policing the global commons beyond Suez and in the Indo Pacific region in particular is arguably zero. It is clearly not part of “a strategic fist that could launch a big punch” anywhere outside the immediate NATO area. The reported short-term deployment of a small number of Typhoon aircraft to Australia does not therefore have any strategic military significance – it is more of a political gesture.
7. Having understood that, the focus (and expense incurred) on integrating the F-35B with the Typhoon surely needs some validation and justification. The Air Commodore states that:

“ It’s not just  about  the platforms,  but the ability to work  together and  maximise/triple the effect,  and we need to keep at it.”

8. This is disingenuous. If it is planned for the Typhoon and the Lightning to work together as a “single unit/in close proximity” for air defence or offence, that would be tactically unsound in a combat environment whether in Europe or farther afield. It would do little to maximise the combat effectiveness of the Lightning. Instead, it would minimise the stealth qualities of the F-35B for which we have paid so much. Hanging external stores on the Lightning would diminish further those important stealth qualities.
9. The article goes on to state that “operationally the F-35 will act as a deep strike ISR platform that can operate in areas that other aircraft cannot. ‘And that’s our choice because the Typhoon would be operating further back … Allowing the Typhoon to stay out of range of the enemy while working with the F-35B’”. [Question. Will the F-35B be the only aircraft listed as being “able to launch a big punch” that ventures within range of the enemy?]
10. It would appear that the Air Commodore and his supporting staff are failing to think outside the overland NATO box and, in doing so, are ignoring the strategic capability and raison d’être of the UK F-35B – i.e. deployment in our carriers throughout the global commons – where there are no Typhoons, and unlikely to be any P8s or E7s, in the force mix. Unquestionably, the Typhoon with all its add-on weapon systems cannot aspire to such a strategic role.
11. This raises the question of whether the ongoing major investment in Typhoon weapon systems is cost and operationally effective regarding the vital protection of our Island Nation global trade routes and energy supplies.

My Commentary: Areas of Financial Concern.

12. The Air Commodore explained why Combat Air in the UK is so important: “There are several reasons, not just for its effects on enemy forces and its actions around the globe (?), but also what it does for UK defence industry.”
13. Planning for the military Defence of the Realm (including by RAF Combat Air in the UK) should not be governed by the profit margins of UK defence contractors (that should play a part but not an overriding part). Following on from paragraph 11, above, the excessive equipping of Typhoon with different weapon systems as revealed in the Article, some of which mirror the capabilities of those already in place, deserves detailed scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee, the Defence Select Committee and, indeed, the Treasury.
14. I use the word “excessive” advisedly. The cumulative cost of the plethora of weapon system modifications and upgrades that have been made or planned to be made to the U.K.’s fleet of Typhoon aircraft amounts to many £ billions. In parallel with these costs, it has been revealed that the planned investment in the Tempest aircraft which will replace Typhoon has reached the staggering figure of £17 billion over the next 10 years.
15. In the interview to which this Insight is responding, RAF’s Combat Air Force Commander proudly lists the Typhoon’s existing or planned weapon systems without any mention of associated costs. Are they all fully justified in terms of Typhoon’s limited global reach and associated lack of strategic import?
16. And will the Tempest and its weapon systems suffer from the same lack of military justification and global reach?
17. For example, one of the items that the Committees and the Treasury might wish to investigate would be the RAF’s sensible procurement of the latest standard of the AMRAAM missile (which is fully proven and documented) and, at the same time, procuring the European competitor to AMRAAM, the Meteor (the capabilities of which have not been fully proven and documented in the public arena). The Typhoon and the F-35B weapon systems already enjoy the full AMRAAM capability. Modifying these aircraft to take the Meteor missile will cost/is costing serious money – and that must be considered, at best, wasteful. Committees and the Treasury would serve the national interest by demanding answers to the following questions, whether in classified or open hearings.
    1. What are the up-to-date unit acquisition costs charged to the UK military budget for the AMRAAM missile and the Meteor missile?
    2. What proven operational advantages, if any, does the Meteor missile enjoy over the AMRAAM missile?
    3. Do these costs and performance differences justify the costly integration of the Meteor missile into the Typhoon and the F-35B weapon systems?
18. Further questions need to be raised concerning the fitting of the Storm Shadow missile to the Typhoon. Operational firings of the Storm Shadow in Iraq and Libya were a complete disaster, with misfires, failure to guide to the target and warhead failures. But the RAF had ordered 900 of these missiles at the turn of the century. Is the expensive fitting of the same to the Typhoon in any way justifiable regarding the perceived threat and the missile’s unreliability/utility? Having been designed to target and interdict hardened vertical structures and suffering from guidance problems, it would appear to be a prime candidate for causing civilian collateral casualties in any form of limited overland war, as in Ukraine.

Conclusion.

19. The article by Alan Warnes demonstrates that the RAF’s Combat Air Force Commander glorifies the fitting of many different weapon systems to the Typhoon without detailed thought regarding their justification and utility in the context of U.K.’s declared strategic policies.
20. “What we have with Typhoon is a very high performance aircraft that can fly at very high speeds for a very long time [I would beg to differ], with an excellent DASS [defensive suite] on board and can carry a lot of weapons.”
21. Then why does it need “to stay out of range of the enemy?”