Providing land-based Tactical Air with Strategic Maritime Mobility

  1. If we are to provide our taxpayers with a decent bang-for-the-buck and, at the same time, significantly improve Britain’s political and military power projection capability, a draconian shift in MOD practice and policy is required.
  2. Current malpractice in Whitehall is not so much a case of “the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing” but more, “the left hand deliberately failing to acknowledge what the right hand should bring to the table”.
  3. The “right hand” is represented by the Government’s formal commitment to a Strategic Maritime Policy, with the centrepiece of that Policy being our two new aircraft carriers. The “left hand” is represented by an outdated and unjustifiable continued MOD interest in the collaborative development of yet another land-based, non-carrier-capable tactical fighter aircraft. This interest is centred upon the Tempest Project which is championed by MOD/Air and is disguised by the woke description “the Future Air Combat System (FCAS)”.
  4. The FCAS project does not even pay lip-service to stated Government Policy. It does not recognise:
    1. the need for any new tactical fighter aircraft to be embarked in/deployable globally within our Fleet Weapon System and/or that of our Naval Allies, and,
    2. it fails to acknowledge that the two most recent European Collaborative Fighter Projects, Tornado and Typhoon, have been extortionately expensive without providing effective global power projection capability – or indeed, any robust protection of UK Airspace from the Soviet/Russian threat.
  5. When one also realises that MOD has made the extraordinary and misguided decision to provide the RAF with administrative control and ownership of the fighter aircraft procured for the air groups of our two new carriers (the F-35B Lightning), one has to question the motives and rationality of that “left hand”. One must also question whether the term, Jointery, has been embraced by the left hand as a convenient tool for a power grab (and one that pays little regard to the national military need).
  6. All that being said, there is now the opportunity to correct this illogical and counter-productive situation. A cost and operationally effective solution has been proposed by Dr. Anthony Wells. An extract of his wisdom is presented below. It provides for a new and definitive RAF role that is directly focused on agreed Government Strategic Policy in support of global maritime force projection.

By Dr. Anthony Wells, 27 October 2021:
“… HMS Queen Elizabeth’s deployment to East Asia and the Indian Ocean represents the continuity that is so important at this moment in history with the challenges that we face from China.This brings me to my final point and is one that I have been emphasizing for some time.I strongly believe that the Royal Air Force should buy the F/A-18, and in particular ensure that they buy at least two squadrons of the “GROWLER” electronic warfare variant. Again not wishing to sound immodest, my considerable knowledge and experience on this side of the pond, 38 years of continuous work for the National Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense, plus my time in Royal Navy uniform working for the US Navy in the mid-1970s, leads me to conclude that if the Royal Air Force proceeds with another stand-alone program the United Kingdom will be potentially wasting considerable national treasure without achieving the crucial operational objectives that will be present in the 2030s and beyond.

An F-18 purchase will enable the United Kingdom to be both interoperable and interchangeable with the US Navy, while also having a land based aircraft for protecting UK air space, NATO missions, and other contingencies other than the strategic global maritime role. RAF squadrons can be interoperable with US CVNs, while Royal Navy F-35B squadrons operate from HM Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales. The GROWLER provides a vital missing UK capability.

I am a firm believer in the “Sharkey Ward” school of thought regarding strategic maritime air power. He is, in my humble opinion, the UK’s finest combat pilot, thinker, and leader since World War Two. The RAF may not like what they hear but the national interest comes first. The incoming Chief of the Defence Staff may wish to consult with Sharkey.

The UK industrial base can prosper well in a well-constructed joint US-UK F/A-18 program. It can be worked out, rest assured.”

  1. Of course, such a way ahead should necessitate full Administrative and Operational Control of all UK carrier-capable tactical fighters being vested in the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm, thereby ensuring efficient Fleet Management and Squadron readiness for embarkation, deployability and combat. It would also complement the logical suggestion that has been mooted in Whitehall that both our strike carriers’ flight decks should be converted to a conventional catapult and arrestor wire configuration. This would significantly enhance Britain’s Strategic Maritime Capability and, at the same time, provide further for the effective air defence of the United Kingdom Air Space against the Russian threat, which currently is not available from land-based resources.
  2. The term, efficient Fleet Management, merits discussion with regard to UK’s land-based front line fighter aircraft. In the RAF, aircraft maintenance and modification programs are under the direct control of aircrew e.g. Squadron Commanding Officers, rather than Air Engineer Officers. Within the two major fighter aircraft programs of the last 4 decades, the Tornado and the Typhoon programs, this control by aviators has led to less than 30% of the aircraft within these programs being operationally ready for frontline duty. For example, when the fleet strength of the Tornado GR program was 134 aircraft, only 28 were fully fitted and ready for combat deployment. These aircraft were referred to as the “Silver Fleet”. The other 106 aircraft were in various stages of deep maintenance, modification and cannibalization. A similar level of unavailability for operations later existed in the 164 aircraft fleet of the Typhoon program. Literally hundreds of extremely expensive aircraft weapons platforms being mismanaged! If one ties these figures in to the reported costs of the Typhoon program at more than £80 billion, one can reasonably establish that approximately £50 billion of taxpayers’ money has been wasted on that project.
  3. Such RAF mismanagement and waste must be considered a scandal and is likely to continue unless drastic measures are taken by our Ministers and the Whitehall establishment.
  4. There is of course a better option available to the Government.
  5. The hackneyed statement that, “We are the Royal Air Force and we are the experts in airpower. We can do what we say we can do!” has come to the end of its misinformed and partisan life. But there is a solution, an alternative to this fiasco.
  6. That is, transfer the Administration and Control of all UK fighter aircraft to the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm. Our Naval Air Engineer Officers at Staff and Squadron level and their dedicated teams have always provided their aircrew with fully modified, ready for action aircraft in the frontline – and this, from very limited resources. That is how the Falklands air war was won. My brilliant Air Engineer Officer in 801 Squadron, Dick Goodenough, ensured that, from an average strength of 8 aircraft, 600 fully armed combat missions were flown in a period of 6 weeks. And he was tasked with providing 601.
  7. I believe that tells the story adequately and confirms the need for drastic change.

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