Misinformation About the Falklands War – Part One

1. As the 40th Anniversary of the 1982 war approaches, it is high time to lay to rest the myths that have been perpetuated in the public arena about the conduct of that War and of the false claims by various participants, large and small.
2. In order to fully understand the context of Operation Corporate, some knowledge of UK military history since World War II is necessary.
3. Our Government has confirmed within the 2021 Integrated Defence Review its intent to support a “refreshed Strategic Maritime Policy”. The latter phrase will probably mean little to a modern British public that has not been properly informed of 20^th century military events, particularly the part played by Naval Carrier Battle Group Expeditionary Force Operations since World War II. They have successfully deterred those that would harm our National Global interests. They have ensured our continued security and commercial prosperity. A summary of these Operations may be accessed through the link provided below:
   Royal Navy Fixed Wing Carrier Operations since 1948
4. There were further Joint Force Expeditionary Operations that could not have been conducted without full Royal Navy Fleet Weapon System support.
5. If we are to invest more wisely in our future military capability, these maritime achievements need to be understood and recognised by politicians and civil servants alike as important lessons. This includes the Falklands War.
6. Third parties, some with well-established publishing pedigrees but without associated military pedigrees, are jumping on the bandwagon of the 40^th Anniversary with articles and books that provide a less than thorough/accurate account of the War and the background to it. For reasons best known to themselves, some of these accounts tend to diminish the success of our Fleet Weapon System. At the same time, they exaggerate the contribution and combat effectiveness of the relatively small part played by our land-based tactical Air Force. And of major significance, they fail to acknowledge the fundamental reason why our Naval Task Force fighter air defences were so limited in number in 1982 and were lacking a beyond visual range Look-down Shoot-down capability, Airborne Early Warning and Air-to-Air Refuelling support.
7. These three capabilities (as well as Defence Suppression) represent norms within the air group of a modern conventional Strike Carrier and are vital aids to combat efficiency and flight safety. The 1967 carrier withdrawal decision by Dennis Healey and his government removed these capabilities and gave our land-based tactical Air Force the responsibility of providing the air defence of our Fleet at sea throughout the oceans of the world. The RAF had claimed fraudulently and without demonstration that they could do this. But when “push came to shove” as in 1982 (and in Belize before that), they failed miserably to answer the call.
8. With our land-based Air Force proving unable to fulfil its promises and its assumed responsibilities, the Falklands Task Force found itself without a full conventional Strike Carrier capability. The Command had to “make do” with a small number of the fairly short-range Sea Harrier fighter aircraft – and it had to conduct combat operations without a look-down shoot-down capability, without Airborne Early Warning and without Air-to-Air Refuelling support. Because of this and as Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward put it, the battle for the Falklands “was a close-run thing”.
9. If the RAF had not fraudulently misled Ministers resulting in the Dennis Healey carrier decision, the Argentine invasion of the Islands and the subsequent Loss of Lives and Treasure on both sides would probably have been avoided. But instead, Leopoldo Galtieri viewed John Nott’s announcement in 1981 that “HMS Invincible was to be sold to the Australians” as manna from heaven. He gambled that the depleted Royal Navy would be able to do nothing to prevent his invasion of the Islands. Fortunately for the UK, he got his timing wrong. A year later, his invasion would have been sustainable and successful.
10. That is the truth of the matter and is something that is religiously ignored in some of the accounts that have been published about the War.
11. Many of these perpetuate the myth that the Vulcan Black Buck missions launched from Ascension Island put the Port Stanley airfield out of action and, at the same time, caused the Argentine Command to move its Mirage III fighter aircraft resources away from the Islands to bolster the air defences of Buenos Aires – thus contributing significantly to the outcome of the war. Neither claim is true. The excellent paper by Lieutenant Colonel Ewen Southby-Tailyour provides the authentic account of the failure of the Black Buck initiative and may be accessed through the following link:
    Stanley Runway and the Black Buck Raids 1982
12. Two of the most recent Falklands books fail to address these truths adequately. One of these is “Harrier 809” by Rowland White of Penguin books.
13. The writing style of this successful author is indeed enjoyed by many. The book reveals interesting facts concerning failed initiatives by the RAF to get more involved in the War and, with Penguin’s marketing power, has become a predictable commercial success.
14. The account of gathering together 809 Squadron reinforcement aircraft, aircrew and engineers in the ill-fated SS Atlantic Conveyor under the helmsmanship of fixed wing aviator Captain Mike Layard RN, later Second Sea Lord, is indeed a most commendable story that needed to be told. The Task Force benefited strongly from the new arrivals in the combat zone where they were subsumed into 800 and 801 Naval Air Squadrons. But for the author to describe the book as “The Epic Story of How a Small Band of Heroes Won Victory in the Air Against Impossible Odds” is entirely misleading, as is the title which should have been “Sea Harrier 809”. It is not an authentic record of Falklands air war events.
15. Helen Parr’s Spectator review of the book refers to it as “a somewhat Boy’s Own perspective on the Falklands war”. I wouldn’t disagree with that. And, more importantly, I do take exception to the manner in which the author plagiarised passages from my own book, “Sea Harrier over the Falklands” and then, to make things worse, massaged the content of the same.
16. My book relates that, given command of the Sea Harrier Introduction to Service, I was blessed with a totally dedicated team of engineers, maintenance ratings and aircrew who followed me through the Trials Unit, the Headquarters Squadron and to the frontline in 801 Naval Air Squadron. They and they alone laid the foundation for the air war victory over the Falklands. Without their loyalty and diligence that war would not have been won. “Harrier 809”s principal witness and contributor appears to take credit for much of my team’s early work – a regrettable attempt at unjustified self-aggrandisement.
17. I am known for not suffering fools gladly and, to put it mildly, I have to say that “Harrier 809” is a glamourised attempt to rewrite history in favour of the often-fictitious achievements of others. Those who contributed to the fiction should be ashamed of attempting to alter that history and, in doing so, tarnish the extraordinary legacy of my team and of our world-beating jump jet fighter.
18. What I am grateful to the author for is revealing the manner in which Rowland White’s main source of information (who served under my command in 801 Naval Air Squadron in HMS Invincible for approximately two weeks) failed to comply with my strict orders concerning the conduct of Combat Air Patrols in defence of Task Force Units. His “rebellion” was evident to me on his first combat mission on 21 May as was reported post flight by his wingman: “He refused to lead his section down from 12,000 feet through a cloud layer to low-level even though there were live reports of enemy air attacks being conducted below.” And from his own description in Harrier 809 of subsequent missions, he remained at high level and not at his appointed low-level Combat Air Patrol station. This negated any deterrence effect that his CAP pair of Sea Harriers should have provided against Argentine fighter bomber attacks on the San Carlos Water beachhead and it could have cost lives.
19. Why he was suddenly removed from Invincible in the heat of the battle without my knowledge after just two weeks on board when aircrew fatigue was dangerously high and we were very short of pilots, is something that is not adequately addressed in “Harrier 809”. It made no military sense.
20. The second book referred to above is “The Falklands Naval Campaign 1982” by the respected Naval Historian, Edward Hampshire. The author demonstrates a wealth of detailed research into the conduct of the Argentine air initiative but a general lack of understanding and history of the basics of Naval Warfare and Naval Air Warfare in particular – such as “defence in depth” with its different interdependent layers/weapon systems.
21. He frequently refers to the Sea Harrier as the Harrier. Although both are jump jets, they were designed for very different main roles: the Royal Navy Sea Harrier primarily for All Weather Fighter Air Defence and Air Intercept and the RAF Harrier GR3 for Ground Attack and Reconnaissance. The Harrier GR3 could not and did not conduct air defence combat missions. These were all conducted by Sea Harrier – a total of 1500 missions. The embarked Harrier GR3s flew a total of about 150 sorties from the deck of HMS Hermes, of which less than 60 were ground attack and reconnaissance combat missions. The bravery and dedication of their pilots was clear to all. But they did not win the air war. That was left to the Fleet Air Arm. The author’s conflation of the two aircraft types is misleading and disappointing – and it panders to the ongoing stream of RAF propaganda.
22. Hampshire goes to considerable lengths explaining the disadvantages experienced by Argentine Air Force and Argentine Navy fighter and fighter bomber aircraft. Yes, their targets, the beachhead in San Carlos Water and the Carrier Battle Group were at considerable range from their home bases but they were not out of reach – as evidenced by the continuous raids mounted against the beachhead in particular. And, of immense advantage, they could launch their attacks at the time of their choosing.
23. But Hampshire’s account does not elucidate with similar emphasis the disadvantages experienced by the Battle Group’s Sea Harrier squadrons, at first just 20 aircraft strong.
24. These disadvantages were mainly as follows:
    1. Initially, Sea Harriers had to provide the outer layer of combat air defence for the Battle Group throughout daylight hours and maintain an overnight deck alert posture. This caused a high level of pilot fatigue.
    2. During and after the San Carlos landing, the limited number of Sea Harriers had to protect the Battle Group and provide a continuous low-level Combat Air Patrol (CAP) presence to the West, Northwest and Southwest of the beachhead. The distance to these patrol stations from the carriers was sometimes in excess of 200 nautical miles, greatly reducing on task time and necessitating a very high sortie rate to keep the CAP stations filled.
    3. Unlike the Argentine air effort, the Battle Group had no Airborne Early Warning/Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft and no Air-to-Air Refuelling support.
    4. Argentina had stationed a sophisticated area air defence radar in the centre of Port Stanley town, surrounded by civilian homes. Interdiction of this radar with bombing raids could have caused significant civilian casualties and was therefore a nonstarter. Black Buck missions armed with anti-radar missiles failed to knock out the radar and so, throughout the war, high level transits of Sea Harrier aircraft en route to CAP Stations were continuously monitored and provided to Argentine attack aircraft who took appropriate advantage of the same.

On balance, these disadvantages provided the Argentine air effort with an overall tactical advantage.

25. In due course, I hope to address more myths that continue to be perpetuated concerning the conduct of and lessons from the Falklands air war. The lack of educated acknowledgment of these lessons is in danger of allowing scarce defence budget funds to be channelled into fanciful projects such as the Future Combat Air System – in other words, the Tempest project. If this relatively short range tactical aircraft project is not completely committed to producing a carrier capable fighter, then it will have no more strategic utility than its predecessors, the Typhoon and the Tornado.
26. Surely, funds now being set aside for the Tempest should be channelled to much better strategic effect into significantly improving the defensive armament the planned Type 31 “utility” frigate which will be a core part of our Strategic Fleet Weapon System.