NEW INQUIRY:
Aviation Procurement.
Date:               22 April 2022.

This Submission is supported by:

• • Dr Anthony Wells.
  • Rear Admiral Jeremy Larken DSO.
  • Commodore Michael Clapp CB.
  • Captain Stewart Thompson.
  • Commander Laon Hulme OBE.
  • Commander Graham Edmonds.
  • Commander Paul Fisher.
  • Lieutenant- Commander Lester May.

SCOPE.

Due to the breadth of this Inquiry, answers provided in this Submission concentrate mainly on Fixed Wing Aviation Procurement.

SUBJECT:

This Submission addresses the Questions iterated by the Committee.

SUMMARY.

1. The Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper iterated a way forward that is based on a refreshed Strategic Maritime Policy. The last 5 decades of Aviation Procurement have not reflected this Policy.
2. The global reach of our Armed Forces depends almost entirely upon the mobility and flexibility of our Fleet Weapon System, the Royal Navy. It should now receive defence funding priority over lesser channels of Warfighting and Deterrence capability.
3. The effective defence of UK airspace represents an ongoing responsibility, but this can be fulfilled more cost and operationally effectively by the Fleet Weapon System with its carrier-borne fighter aircraft.
4. The changed security situation in Europe does not in any way detract from the needs for our Island Nation to maintain a robust global reach and power projection capability. These needs are different from our European mainland allies.

INTRODUCTION.

1. Assumption. This Submission assumes that current and future Aviation Procurement will be based on Strategic Policy, the Perceived Threat to our Island Nation Defence and Security Interests, and Lessons from the past.
2. The graphic below indicates the balance of investment (up to 2018) in Military Combat Aviation assets during the last 5 decades.

3. The non-Carrier-capable, Land-Based weapon systems procured during that period did not, in the main, contribute to the deterrence of those that might harm our Strategic Global Maritime interests – being unable to deploy in a timely manner and in strength outside the immediate European/NATO area.
4. In sharp contrast, the Fleet Weapon System, including Carrier-capable Combat Air, enjoyed the freedom of the Global Commons and despite minimal investment, demonstrated the global utility and flexibility of maritime power.
5. In the graphic below, the circles indicate the limited number of Sovereign Territories outside the NATO area to which Land-Based Combat Air may be deployed in some strength without third-party approval. The other vast areas of the world’s oceans remain out of reach.

6. Whether deterring our enemies, policing our trade and energy supply routes worldwide or responding to rising tensions in distant theatres, the “Tip of the Spear” of UK’s Military and Political Power Projection Capability is represented by the Royal Navy Fleet Weapon System, including Combat Air.
7. Accordingly, the recent imbalance of Aviation Procurement investment in Fixed and Rotary Wing Combat Aviation Assets, as referred to above, warrants urgent revision. In the context of Strategic Maritime Policy, a large proportion of the billions of pounds sterling invested in Land-Based Air has been wasted.

QUESTION 1.

8. Will the proposals set out in the Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper deliver the aviation capabilities (fixed-wing and rotary), combat mass and interoperability required of UK Armed Forces, particularly in light of the changed security situation in Europe?
9. The “tip of the spear” of our Armed Forces’ conventional deterrence and power projection capability is represented by the Fixed Wing Air Groups embarked in our 2 new Strike Carriers with their reach throughout the Global Commons, and, by Rotary Wing aircraft embarked in escorting surface warships. The 2 capital warships, integrated as they are within the Fleet Weapon System alongside our Surface Fleet, Anti-Submarine Helicopter Force, Submarines, Royal Marines, Amphibious Platforms and Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, represent UK’s authentic Present and Future Combat Air System (PFCAS).
10. Defence Investment and Procurement in aviation assets should now be viewed through this lens, i.e., ensuring that the “tip of the spear” of our Armed Forces’ deterrence and power projection capability receives priority treatment over lesser channels of capability. That appears not to be taking place.
11. A significant shortfall in the content of the Review and the Command Paper was the failure to commit to the procurement of an adequate number of F-35B aircraft to service the air group needs of our two Strike Carriers which do indeed, according to stated Policy, represent the tip of UK’s spear (see also response to Question 2a, below).
12. As such, they may be deployed at will throughout the Global Commons in the littoral and/or in the open ocean to challenge and deter those that would do us harm. Their modus operandi is to work in close cooperation with U.S. Navy Strike Fleets and other allied navies to protect the freedom of the seas for the benefit of all.
13. Should Russian bombers with their long-range stand-off missiles (1200 nautical miles plus) once again threaten to mount an attack on Northern Europe and the UK around the North Cape, our land-based fighter aircraft do not have the range and endurance ability to create an effective barrier against such an attack. Only Carrier Battle Groups can fulfil this role – as they did during the Cold War.
14. The Ukraine affair appears to have woken up several European nations (especially Germany) from their peacetime hibernation and reminded them that
    1. Relying on others to defend them from military threats and that
    2. Being unwilling to stand up and be counted in a military confrontation,

is irresponsible and dangerous. (This wake-up call is also pertinent to your Inquiry – in the light of the sustained and less than logical decline of investment in the Royal Navy.) “Peace through Strength” is the only answer, and our European neighbours must now demonstrate their will to defend their own sovereign territory with effective defence investment, not just words. The UK should not even dream of doing it for them. Rather, we should look to our Island Nation needs and invest more heavily in our true PFCAS, the Royal Navy.

QUESTION 2, a.

15. What is the rationale behind, and what are the implications of, planned reductions to the existing fleet, including: Combat air, with the early retirement of Tranche 1 Typhoons and the apparent scaling-back of commitments to purchase additional F35-B fighter aircraft?

The Rationale: Land-Based Combat Air.

16. The rationale behind planned reductions of the Land-Based Combat Air Fleet is that land-based combat aircraft that are not carrier-capable have relatively little utility regarding Global Military Air Power Projection. They do not have the necessary flexibility to deploy urgently and in strength as a First Echelon force beyond the immediate NATO/European region. They have negligible capability to do so on a global basis, whether to the Indo-Pacific region or even the South Atlantic. The Falklands war demonstrated this emphatically and it is a lesson that the Committee and all politicians/public servants should bear in mind when considering the way ahead.
17. Reference to the Typhoon fleet reduction in particular invites serious comment. What is its utility? What is its military role? How much is the program costing? Is this cost justified in terms of global military capability?
18. Regarding “future-proofing our fleet”, we must pay critical regard to and the justification for current and future assets. Only through such a process can the most cost-effective balance of investment be made. What therefore is the utility and military role of the Typhoon in the context of Strategic Maritime Policy? It has some utility for the token reinforcement of NATO countries on the Eastern front and for policing UK international airspace but that is where its utility and justification end.
19. The Quick Reaction Alert role for the interception of intruders into our airspace was conducted satisfactorily during the Cold War by just one squadron of F-4K Phantoms based at RAF Leuchars. In the light of that history, the proposal made in the Review/Command Paper that up to 7 squadrons of Typhoons should be commissioned cannot be justified and does not in any way reflect the intent and need of our rejuvenated Strategic Policy.
20. The Chair of the Public Accounts Committee 2011, the Right Honourable Margaret Hodge, reported on the Typhoon program and stated that
    1. the overall cost of the program was likely to exceed £55 billion (reportedly, that cost has now risen to more than 80 billion) and that
    2. the 2 senior RAF witnesses were evasive and uncooperative concerning costs and the program in general.

One must ask, what were they hiding? Exorbitant costs and limited capability appear to be the answer.

21. These costs cannot be justified in terms of global military reach and, if anything, signal a need for further reductions in the Typhoon Fleet, many of which aircraft are not fully available for front line combat deployment but continue devouring defence funds with modification after modification after modification (as was the case with the Tornado fleet).
22. The Committee will wish to bear in mind that the Tempest program is likely to be equally expensive and, unless it is fully configured for operational embarkation in our aircraft carriers, it will suffer from the same deficiencies and shortfalls as the Typhoon: contributing little if anything to the conduct of our new Strategic Maritime Policy – and diverting special funds away from the tip of the spear.

The Rationale: Scaling Back the Procurement of the F-35B Multi-role Fighter.

23. In the light of the lack of mobility, deployability and utility of Land-Based Combat Air as described above, the scaling back of the procurement of F-35B fighters stands as a serious error in judgment. If continued it will blunt the tip of the spear and deny our Carrier Battle Groups much of the vital air defence and offensive capability that the Fleet Weapon System depends upon – and with it, our national power projection and defence capability.
24. For operational effectiveness and at minimum, each Carrier Air Group should be established with two 12 aircraft Naval Fighter Squadrons. These should be supported by an 18 aircraft Naval Headquarters and Training Squadron. The Committee should note that effective, embarked, multi-role Naval Air Warfare entails more varied operational training needs than those required of land-based air defence fighter aircrew. Additional aircraft procurement will also be needed to cater for attrition, in-service aircraft modification programs and background support activities at A&AE Boscombe Down and RAE Farnborough.
25. F-35B procurement numbers for Naval Service alone should be an establishment of not less than 78 aircraft.

QUESTION 2, b.

26. [Scaling back] Fleet mobility, with regard to the early retirement of the C-130J Hercules, and the removal of the Puma and older Chinook helicopters from service.
27. The detail of this issue may well be best addressed by the Army and the RAF. But there are fundamental underlying issues that deserve general comment and Committee attention.

True Global Aviation Fleet Mobility and Logistics.

28. Our Strategic Maritime Policy demands the full mobility and deployability of our Armed Forces. It is without question that our deployed Fleet enjoys some excellent logistic support from land-based transport aircraft, and the availability of support helicopters can be critical when and if “boots on the ground” operations take place. Getting such helicopters to a distant theatre of combat or tension is of course one of the many benefits of having a robust Navy in being.
29. The First Echelon components of each of our Armed Forces need to be fully mobile and able to respond urgently in whatever theatre of contention or combat that is required. Their peacetime training and commitments must reflect this to ensure operational effectiveness. The Review and the Command Paper did not address this.
30. It would appear to be of major import that UK’s establishment of
    1. Non-carrier-capable Land-based fighter squadrons and indeed
    2. The Army’s heavy armour assets

do not have the vehicular logistic support available for the rapid long-range deployment in strength and follow-on sustainment of their combat units. (I understand, for instance, that UK would not be able to transport swiftly large numbers of tanks and heavy artillery to the Eastern front.) This cannot be considered as getting “a decent bang for the taxpayers’ buck”. Major financial resources are tied up with the maintenance of these 2 large military Arms – resources that would be better used through investment in the tip of the spear.

QUESTION 2, c.

31. [Scaling Back) Airborne early warning and control, with the early retirement of the E-3D Sentry and the decision to reduce the number of E – 7A Wedgetails entering service from 5 to 3.
32. In the light of all the above, it is apposite to refer to UK’s land-based fighter squadrons as tactical rather than strategic assets. That being the case and global deployability being in question, the Committee might well question the justification for a significant establishment of supporting, land-based Airborne Early Warning and Control and sister aircraft such as the E-7A: none of the same being available for global deployments without third-party basing rights and overflight rights approval. Their extreme vulnerability to enemy action in or close to a combat theatre, whether in the air or on the ground, raises the question, “Will they ever be deployed in useful direct support of Expeditionary Task Force Operations?”
33. At the same time, the Committee will appreciate the need for carrier borne AEW and Defence Suppression aircraft for all Carrier Battle Group deployments outside the European/NATO area. These 2 key capabilities are currently provided by US Carrier Groups – reinforcing the case for close Allied Naval cooperation.

QUESTION 3.

34. Will the uplifted contracts for both rotary and fixed wing Military Flying Training effectively and rapidly resolve capacity issues?
35. On 31^st March 2022 the MoD will have retired all its Hawk T1As (about 75 in all, of which 12 were in service with the Navy). Most of the RAF T1As were in a mothballed state in hangars. This withdrawal from service was part of the desire under IDSR to rid the military of its obsolescent equipment. The 28 Hawk T2s (all of which are in service with the RAF) will remain.
36. With the loss of the T1As, the Navy loses much of its important ability to train the surface fleet in combatting air attack by aircraft and/or missiles. It is unlikely that the RAF will be willing to take over this role. There is therefore an excellent case for 12 T2s to be transferred to the Navy from the RAF.

CONCLUSION.

37. Current and future Military Aviation Procurement should be aligned strictly to UK’s Strategic Maritime Policy as an Island Nation and focused mainly on the air defence and offensive air needs of the Fleet Weapon System.
38. More rigorous attention and justification (if any) should be applied to all current and future non-carrier-capable Aviation Procurement programs including especially the Tempest program. Without such discipline being applied, UK’s Strategic Maritime interests will not be met, and the nugatory expenditure of billions of pounds sterling will once more be realised – preventing the more pressing need to invest in and expand our Naval Fleet.

RECOMMENDATION.

39. In the light of the lack of operational utility and of the extraordinary cost of some major Aviation Procurement programs over recent decades, it is strongly recommended that the Defence Department procedures for approving future programs and embracing current programs are thoroughly revised. Each program must be carefully scrutinised through a new professional lens, i.e.
    1. Does the program directly enhance the capability desired of our Strategic Maritime Policy?
    2. Is the program directly related to and capable of countering the perceived threat/s?
    3. Is the weapon system rapidly deployable in strength throughout the littoral of the Global Commons in support of military operations?
    4. If not, why not?
    5. What are the logistic support needs for the effective deployment of the weapon system? And are these available?
    6. Does the size of the program reflect its utility for Deterrence and Warfighting throughout the Global Commons?