“Disingenuous Politics”, whether in the workplace or
at Government level, can be Counterproductive.

Leadership, Honesty, and Integrity.

1. The success of any organization, large or small, depends upon good teamwork throughout that organization. Good leadership coupled with honesty and integrity is perhaps the most important factor for enabling team success. It empowers individual team members with self-confidence, mutual trust, and dedication to their mission.
2. I have been blessed with exposure to good leaders and good leadership throughout my life and it is important to note that although each of these leaders may have differed in character and personality, they all had a common trait: the ability to inspire their subordinates through personal example/pedigree, through trust and an associated ability to delegate. It was my honour and privilege to serve under the extraordinary leadership of Captain JJ Black in HMS Invincible in 1982. He set a wonderful example to us all.
3. I have also suffered under, albeit briefly, and witnessed poor leadership where egocentric ambition and/or a tick-in-the-box mentality plus a lack of professional competence has had an adverse effect on the morale and performance of team members.
4. What, you may ask, does leadership have to do with “politics” and strategic defence? I would suggest everything.
5. At the highest level of democratic government, the constitution of the political establishment would appear to be an Achilles heel of fully effective governance, especially regarding national security. There is no firm requirement for a political candidate to have demonstrated any form of professional competence, whether in industry, commerce, or defence. Indeed, many candidates have spent their years without such experience and have been groomed exclusively to succeed in politics within their respective political parties – resulting later in prime examples of Without Knowledge or Expertise.
6. We in the UK have a Parliament of elected Members who are our decision-makers but who, in many instances, do not have the background or personal expertise on which to base reliable judgment. And so, quite rightly, they must rely upon the input they get from an acknowledged subject-related Agency. In matters relating to Strategic Defence and Security that input is derived from the Ministry of Defence (MOD).
7. This reliance is where the system often fails. Not unreasonably, our MPs and supporting Civil Servants expect to hear the truth from the MOD. That expectation is often not well-founded. In-house political games between Services can and do lead to obfuscation, misinformation and occasionally outright lies. Unfortunately, honesty and integrity are not qualities that can be reliably associated with this “bastion of military advice”: especially when the “loudest voice” has been lying to or misleading Ministers on a regular basis since the flawed Healey carrier decision of the late 60s. With that in mind should we, the taxpayers, not expect our parliamentarians to require the MOD to properly justify and demonstrate the efficacy of its input? MPs might feel that they have been obliged to “trust” but, arguably, they have not applied due diligence by failing to “verify”. This failure has cost the UK taxpayer hundreds of billions of pounds sterling on poorly justified weapon systems over the past 4 decades.
8. Disingenuous politics within the relationship between the MOD and the Houses of Parliament has demonstrably diminished UK’s Strategic Defence capability through the inordinate over-investment of scarce defence budget funds in weapon systems that have proved to have little military utility on the global stage.

The Much-Needed Investment of Full Operational Control in the Frontline.

9. As a direct result of the present incontinent Ministry of Defence system, UK’s Fleet Weapon System (the Royal Navy) does not have full Administrative and Operational Control of the aircraft which constitute its vital outer layer of air defence – the F-35B, carrier-borne fighter aircraft. This might almost be acceptable (and that is a stretch) if honesty and integrity were the norm in the MOD. But that is not the case.
10. Why does such Control need to be vested in the Commander of a UK Expeditionary Task Force engaging in deterrence or armed combat in the global littoral? The simple answer is that without such control of all available weapons systems, the Commander in theatre is unable to make some of the rapid decisions necessary to safeguard the defence and security of the Task Force. There are three good examples of how distant control from outside the theatre of action can and did have a detrimental effect on the course of in-theatre military defensive and offensive operations.
11. The first relates to the Vulcan Black Buck missions in the Falklands War. The Commander of the UK Task Force, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, was prevailed upon by the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Michael Beetham, to reduce the ability of the Carrier Battle Group (CBG) to defend itself whenever a Vulcan was approaching the Islands. CBG units were prohibited from firing at any air contact while the Vulcan was in the area. This left the CBG completely vulnerable to enemy air action, thereby hazarding the lives of thousands of Task Force personnel. This risk averse policy of the RAF jeopardised the safety of our warships and could have been avoided if operational control of the limited Vulcan assets had been transferred to the Royal Navy Task Force.
12. The second relates to absence of the Nimrod during Operation Desert Storm. When the Coalition Commander, General Stormin’ Norman, requested support from the RAF in the form of Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft being tasked to patrol the northern reaches of the Arabian Gulf, the request was denied on the spurious grounds that the Nimrod force “was committed to other operations”. It has since been established that these “other operations” consisted of more than a dozen return flights from RAF Kinloss to Gibraltar: ostensibly mapping the domestic movement of commercial shipping in the intervening sea areas. A poor risk averse excuse for avoiding deployment to within the combat zone. This could have been avoided if operational control had been invested in the Coalition Commander.
13. The third example is of course the most topical and egregious. Stalin paved the way for this one with his inept micromanagement and control of the tactics and missions conducted by the Russian army in World War II. He did not understand that the most effective way of waging conventional military warfare against an adversary was to leave the conduct of the war to his generals. Define the aim as Head of State, yes, but leave the planning and execution to the professionals. The President of the United States (POTUS) decided not to follow this route when he personally micromanaged the recent withdrawal of US and Allied Forces from Afghanistan. According to the sworn testimony given to Congress by his various Defense, State and Intelligence Departments and Agencies, he ignored all their advice about how to conduct the withdrawal in a safe and measured way. Under his personal direction, the withdrawal was an unmitigated disaster that left American citizens and Allied supporters behind in the hands of the Taliban – as well as billions of dollars-worth of high-tech, sensitive, military equipment and weapon systems. The POTUS wished to be remembered as the President who ended the war in Afghanistan and, critically, he wanted this to occur at any cost no later than the 20th anniversary of 9/11. His politically based intent ruled the day but, as we now know, his search for glory backfired. It was a strategic error of huge proportions, the full defence cost of which to Western Alliances has yet to be ascertained. And all because he failed to delegate operational control of the withdrawal to his frontline professionals.
14. At a very different level, the direct control/micromanagement of the Sea Harrier Squadron mission tasks in HMS Hermes during the Falklands War by members of the Admiral’s Staff proved to be completely counterproductive. For example, it wasted meagre air defence resources on countless visual searches of sea-surface areas. The most infamous incident resulting from such inappropriate control was the removal of the Combat Air Patrol Sea Harriers from the outer layer of air defence to conduct visual surface search. This resulted directly in the gap in physical air defence being penetrated by an Exocet-armed Étendard and the sinking of HMS Sheffield.
15. Returning to the farcical arrangement of UK carrier air groups being under the operational control of the risk-averse land-based Air Force, it is easy to see from the precedents set and discussed at paragraphs 11 and 12, above, that the need to increase our carrier air groups to the full combat establishment of 2 embarked F-35B squadrons in a time of tension could be thwarted. It is reasonable to suggest that the RAF would once again claim it had “other commitments”. Inter-service politics could rule the day and place our maritime forces in jeopardy. And this would undoubtedly have a severe adverse effect upon UK’s contribution to maintaining the freedom of the seas.

Loyalty downwards, sideways and upwards at all levels of defence.

16. If our Armed Forces are to become a truly effective interdependent team, there need to be important changes in Whitehall from the highest level downwards.
17. Trust relies upon honesty and integrity. This can only be assured within our Armed Forces and MOD if carte blanche “trust” on the part of the Government concerning Defence Procurement is irrevocably linked to a mandatory need to “demonstrate, verify and justify”. Implementation of such a policy is vital if we as a nation are to proceed down the right track with respect to a robust strategic defence capability.
18. A major stumbling block in the path of creating genuine public trust concerning the Defence Department is the lack of transparency regarding project and procurement costs. British Aerospace Systems is high on the list of default here as they often hide their contracted costs behind the definition, “Classified”. This would appear to be Wokery at its worst. For example, Typhoon maintenance, repair and modification costs remain hidden, thereby preventing any form of serious product evaluation, justification, and verification by the government and/or the end customer.
19. Trust is essential for the efficient performance of a team, whether that team is a Government Department or a frontline fighting unit. And inextricably linked to trust is that important quality, loyalty. This is fundamental to team success. There are many pertinent definitions of loyalty. Here are two taken from the web:

“When employers and employees are loyal to one another, employee satisfaction, productivity, and company profitability increases. In definition, loyalty is a strong feeling of support to either a person, place, or cause.”
And,
“When we are debating an issue, loyalty means giving me your honest opinion, whether you think I’ll like it or not.”

20. The second definition above would appear to reflect the expression, “speaking truth to power”. A good staff officer in the military will convey to his commanding officer his honest opinion. A good commanding officer and leader will listen carefully to and analyse that opinion even if it differs from his own. If the staff officer’s professional advice has good foundation, he will accept it and change course. This discipline allows the team to forge ahead along the right path. I followed this policy during my 3 Squadron Commands, and it paid huge dividends with the success of my team in peace and war.
21. Yes men, whose personal ambition prevents them from ever disagreeing with their boss, are too often rated highly in their confidential reports and earn early promotion. Arguably however, this subservience does not benefit team potential or success. Sandy Woodward once confided in me, “Sharkey, if you had been less vocal, you would have been an Admiral. Then you could speak your mind more effectively.”
22. “Ahhh!” I replied. “Yes, Sandy, but by then I could have been brain-washed into being a Yes Man and would have lost my self-respect – keeping that is more important to me. It allows me to sleep easy! And anyway, I now have you as my mouthpiece!”
23. Rest In Peace, my wonderful friend!