“Beware of Making the Same Mistake Again”

1. As the new year dawned in 1982, the inestimably ignorant and incompetent Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, was busy persuading Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that UK does not need aircraft carriers and that our new Sea Harrier Carrier HMS Invincible (in which I was serving as Commanding Officer of 801 Naval Air Squadron) should be sold off to the Australians.
2. In parallel with this misguided intent, Argentina’s military dictator, Galtieri was planning the invasion of the Falkland Islands in order to divert public attention away from his death squads. As part of this planning, Argentina was procuring the Exocet-armed Étendard naval fighter aircraft from the French government (who also supplied technical support and assistance for the operational deployment of the aircraft with its antiship sea-skimming missile).
3. There were many warning signs of an impending invasion of U.K.’s South Atlantic sovereign territory but these were all discounted by the Prime Minister’s advisers, including the well-respected British intelligence community. Ignoring this intelligence led to the invasion of the Falkland Islands followed by the Falklands war itself.
4. Britain had to respond but the Chiefs of the Air Staff (RAF) and the General Staff (Army) declared to the Prime Minister during War Cabinet deliberations “that they could do nothing to recapture the Islands. The islands were too far away and completely out of reach”. Sir Henry Leach’s Royal Navy and Royal Marines came to the rescue with a strategic Task Force of aircraft carriers, hunter killer submarines, surface warships, amphibious forces and Royal Fleet Auxiliaries. These units were strongly supported by Britain’s Merchant Navy. In the short but very intense war, the Task Force prevailed and, against all odds, retook the Islands with a famous victory.
5. How is this history relevant today?

Point 1.

6. Within Argentina, there continues to be a tidal wave of angry public and private opinion against the “righteousness” of Britain’s sovereignty over the Islands. This typically Latin viewpoint and temperament is unlikely to change. Reportedly and recently, there was even a national holiday celebrating “Victory in the Malvinas”. It is reasonable to suggest therefore, that their own claim of sovereignty will not go away and, they will go to any length to pursue all avenues, whether political, diplomatic or military, to oust Britain from the Islands.
7. One example of their animosity is that the Argentine only allows one flight per week of any aircraft type from their mainland to the islands. All other flights destined for the islands are banned from using Argentina airspace, including those from Chile. The latter are compelled to circumnavigate the southern tip of South America by a considerable distance when en route.

Point 2.

8. The strategic importance of the Islands is now very different from and much more compelling than in 1982. The courting of economic and political influence over many South American nations by China, including Argentina, is testament to the strategic maritime importance of the sovereignty of the Islands. The Chinese are clearly intent upon dominating the South Atlantic and, of even greater import, leading the way within the multinational efforts to occupy and control the Antarctica continent. A Chinese foothold within the Falklands would assist them with their intent and represent a serious threat to the freedom of the seas in the South Atlantic – all very much against Western interests.

Point 3.

9. Amidst the global maritime and territorial aggrandisement by China, what is the state of play with regard to Britain’s ability to defend the Islands from future military aggression? The recent news that the Danish government is negotiating the sale of 24 F-16 fighters (plus one for ground training) to Argentina has got to be of some concern. That sale has yet to be confirmed and may not come to fruition – witness the sale of two P-3 Orion aircraft by Norway to Argentina which has yet to be satisfactorily completed.
10. But isn’t it important that the UK takes all threats seriously until they are discounted formally? What air-to-air (and air-to-surface) missiles will be provided for these F-16s? Will these include state-of-the-art beyond visual range AMRAAM missiles? If so, this could enable airspace denial and air superiority over the Islands. Does this not remind you of the Étendard/Exocet procurement prior to 1982?
11. Would the stationing of four Typhoon aircraft at RAF Mount Pleasant be enough to deter such dominance? I think not. The RAF record of maintaining full operational serviceability of their fighter aircraft is miserable. It is more than likely that only two Typhoons would be available to counter such air superiority. And I am reminded that, in a head-to-head fighter meet in Turkey, the Pakistani F-16s trounced the Typhoons during within visual range fighter combat.
12. Bearing the above in mind, we should question how many of U.K.’s AMRAAM and other missiles have been deployed to the Falklands as ready to use ordnance for the very limited Typhoon unit. This should be compared with the limited number of AMRAAM and other missiles provided to the magazines of our two new carriers – the latter having true strategic mobility and a compelling need to be properly armed when deployed.

Point 4.

13. I have reports that the Falkland Islanders now feel alienated and poorly served by the RAF mini-empire at the Mount Pleasant airfield. It is the only airfield capable of servicing the regular needs of the Islanders. Instead of attempting to satisfy those needs, the RAF contingent conducts itself to its own entire satisfaction. One example of this has a direct effect on the ability or otherwise of the airfield to provide 24/7 protection against air attack.
14. Apparently, when the prevailing winds from the north-west cross over the mountains before reaching the airfield, they occasionally create turbulence, sometimes severe, that could affect the launch and recovery of aircraft from the runway. As a result, the on-site RAF meteorologists do their best to forecast periods of such turbulence. Based on such forecasts, the airfield command closes the airfield down for the forecast period, allowing no air operations during the same (recently, four days with the airfield completely closed). I understand that the Chilean pilots operating from the airfield are happy to contend with the turbulence and continue flying – but to no avail.
15. This does not fit well with times of tension or when under the threat of imminent attack.

Point 5.

16. It begs the question, “Is the RAF capable of maintaining a realistic 24/7 air defence of the Islands?” Or are they just posing and enjoying themselves? Ministry of Defence/Air will no doubt protest strongly that:
    1. All is well down south.
    2. They have contingency plans for the rapid air reinforcement of the Islands.
17. But they must be forced to explain how and with what. The limited number of Voyager Air-to-Air Refuelling aircraft is already overcommitted elsewhere and would be vulnerable to the F-16 threat.
18. The compelling truth of the matter is that a robust air defence capability cannot be mounted by a minuscule deployment of four Typhoon aircraft, not all of which are serviceable enough for combat operations. They do not represent a realistic deterrence against the projected Argentina air threat. A meaningful deterrence can only be provided by the availability of aircraft carriers, surface warships, hunter killer submarines and Royal Fleet Auxiliaries.
19. In the light of all the above, should not the House of Commons Defence Select Committee address these matters urgently and recommend major changes to the investment priorities of the recent Defence Review – investing more heavily in U.K.’s only Strategic Power Projection Capability, that is the Royal Navy and Royal Marines.