Five decades of wokery

Google definitions of Woke.

Verb: past of “wake”.
Adjective: “alert to injustice in society, especially racism”.
“we need to stay angry, and stay woke“.

Merriam-Webster definition.
“aware of and actively attentive to important facts and issues”.

My Definition: WOKE – WithOut Knowledge or Expertise.

1. To be very clear, I condemn “racism” in all its forms. My Insight does not and will not address this particular issue further.

2. However, if we combine the Merriam-Webster definition with the Google definition, we come up with “Aware of and actively attentive to important facts and issues ….. We need to stay angry, and stay woke”. And if we apply this to the UK defence debate over the last five decades, we can only come to one conclusion and that is, “Wokery has existed in Whitehall throughout that period of time”. Hence my own definition of the acronym, WOKE – WithOut Knowledge or Expertise.

3. Many misguided Military Defence Procurement decisions have been taken/approved by various agencies without those agencies appearing to be aware of and actively attentive to important facts and issues, such as:
   1. the actual record of recent military history,
   2. the perceived global threats that have been acknowledged by our Government, and
   3. the demonstrated military effectiveness of each desired weapon system.

3. In the simplest of terms, questionable/unjustifiable procurement decisions have been taken by senior personnel who do not have the proven military knowledge or expertise to qualify them for the same: whether Politicians, Civil Servants or Ministry of Defence representatives. As something of an accredited expert in my field of Naval Air Warfare, I do feel persuaded to “stay angry” and make public my concerns over such irresponsibility.

4. The latter part of my new book concerning the Decline of the Royal Navy addresses this “wokery” in detail. An extraordinary example of this was presented by the “guidance and views” of the then Minister of Defence, John Nott, concerning the 1981 Defence Review. He had no understanding at all of maritime strategy and the need to defend our Island Nation’s global interests from those who would harm us by interdicting our trade routes, energy supplies or, indeed, attacking our Overseas Territories. Such was his ignorance that he stated (not verbatim), “our Navy has a limited role which is protecting our homeland base out to a range of no more than 40 miles offshore”.

5. In parallel, the Royal Air Force continuously asserted that Britain does not need aircraft carriers and that land-based aircraft could provide protection for the Fleet throughout the Global Commons i.e. the high seas. The Falklands conflict demonstrated in comprehensive and unequivocal fashion the fraudulent basis of this claim.

6. With “the big lie” about land-based aircraft capability having at last been recognized for what it was, the RAF are now keen to switch horses and embark their latest fighter, the F-35B, in our new carriers. Without such embarkation, they would be unable to deploy globally and rapidly in defence of our interests.

7. Such embarkation should, of course, be seen for what it is: unqualified acceptance of the logic and arguments presented in my Insight document, “The Strategic Air Defence of our Interests”. The RAF’s ability to support declared Strategic Maritime Policy can only be realised through deployment of their frontline fighter aircraft as part of the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm.

8. But will they be willing to sustain such deployment? What does the track record show?

9. With the withdrawal of the Sea Harrier from service, Naval Fighter Wing and RAF GR7 and GR9 Harriers were supposed to provide the essential embarked Air Groups for our remaining Invincible class carriers. The Naval Squadron did indeed embark and deploy on a regular basis. But the RAF Squadrons failed to embark for more than a few weeks – and that was over a period of several years. And when they did embark alongside the Naval Fighter Wing squadron in support of United Nations personnel ashore in Sierra Leone, they refused to fly Armed Reconnaissance missions over the land “because they were afraid of not being able to find their way back to the ship”. The embarked Navy squadron of Sea Harriers immediately stood up and did their job for them.

10. Will the RAF F-35B Squadrons follow suit on completion of the current high profile HMS Queen Elizabeth deployment to the far east? Or will they answer the call and be continuously available as embarked units within the Fleet Weapon System? Recent history indicates that they will use any excuse not to do so.

11. The remedy for this serious problem is clear. Administrative Authority and Operational Control of all UK’s carrier-capable fighter aircraft, especially the F-35B, should be and must be vested in the Royal Navy. When a Carrier Battle Group enters a theatre of high tension or combat, it cannot afford for any of its embarked squadrons refusing to fly.